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The Use Of Alternative Reasons In Probabilistic Judgment
Abstract
This dissertation investigates people’s ability to search for and use alternative reasons while making
probabilistic judgments, with the goals of devising and testing (1) a new actively open-minded thinking
(AOT) measure that assesses thinking behavior by looking at people’s ability to generate alternative reasons/
contradicting evidence, and (2) a short online module to train people in actively open-minded thinking. In
Chapter 1 we assessed individual differences in actively open-minded thinking on probabilistic judgment
tasks by using both belief and behavioral measures. In the first three studies subjects made probabilistic
judgments in three-choice almanac questions, while in the fourth study subjects made point and confidence
interval estimates for numerical almanac questions. Compared to the low scoring subjects, subjects who score
high on the new behavioral AOT measure were more likely to have more accurate probability judgments when
they did not know the correct answer to the question. Higher scores on the behavioral actively open-minded
thinking measure were also associated with lower overconfidence. In Chapter 2 we tested the effectiveness of
making subjects consider alternative reasons and a one-hour long online training module in AOT. Studies 4
and 5 tested whether making subjects consider alternative reasons would improve their accuracy and decrease
their overconfidence. In Study 4 we observed that this intervention was successful in increasing the number of
alternative reasons and subjects’ accuracy when subjects did not know the correct answer. There was also a
slight decrease in overconfidence as a result of this intervention. Study 5, which used point estimate questions,
did not show any benefits of the intervention in accuracy or overconfidence. Studies 6 and 7 tested the
effectiveness of new online AOT training modules we designed for adults. The training module in Study 6 did
not show any improvement in subjects’ accuracy, but the training condition in Study 7 increased subjects’
accuracy scores when subjects did not know the correct answer. We observed some effect of the training on
subjects’ overconfidence such that going through the training decreased subjects’ unwarranted confidence.
Chapter 3 discusses the relation between the behavioral and belief measures of AOT, their effects on accuracy
and overconfidence. We specifically argue that while the belief measure of AOT assesses general AOT
tendencies, the behavioral measure of AOT assesses task specific AOT behavior. The results show that
considering alternative reasons increases subjects’ accuracy by lowering their overconfidence. We finally
discuss our results from training adult population in AOT and suggest potential testing scenarios for our
training module.
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ABSTRACT 
THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE REASONS IN PROBABILISTIC JUDGMENT 
Burcu Gürçay-Morris 
Jonathan Baron, Ph.D. 
This dissertation investigates people’s ability to search for and use alternative reasons 
while making probabilistic judgments, with the goals of devising and testing (1) a new 
actively open-minded thinking (AOT) measure that assesses thinking behavior by looking 
at people’s ability to generate alternative reasons/contradicting evidence, and (2) a short 
online module to train people in actively open-minded thinking. In Chapter 1 we assessed 
individual differences in actively open-minded thinking on probabilistic judgment tasks 
by using both belief and behavioral measures. In the first three studies subjects made 
probabilistic judgments in three-choice almanac questions, while in the fourth study 
subjects made point and confidence interval estimates for numerical almanac questions. 
Compared to the low scoring subjects, subjects who score high on the new behavioral 
AOT measure were more likely to have more accurate probability judgments when they 
did not know the correct answer to the question. Higher scores on the behavioral actively 
open-minded thinking measure were also associated with lower overconfidence. In 
Chapter 2 we tested the effectiveness of making subjects consider alternative reasons and 
a one-hour long online training module in AOT. Studies 4 and 5 tested whether making 
subjects consider alternative reasons would improve their accuracy and decrease their 
overconfidence. In Study 4 we observed that this intervention was successful in 
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increasing the number of alternative reasons and subjects’ accuracy when subjects did not 
know the correct answer. There was also a slight decrease in overconfidence as a result of 
this intervention. Study 5, which used point estimate questions, did not show any benefits 
of the intervention in accuracy or overconfidence. Studies 6 and 7 tested the effectiveness 
of new online AOT training modules we designed for adults. The training module in 
Study 6 did not show any improvement in subjects’ accuracy, but the training condition in 
Study 7 increased subjects’ accuracy scores when subjects did not know the correct 
answer. We observed some effect of the training on subjects’ overconfidence such that 
going through the training decreased subjects’ unwarranted confidence. Chapter 3 
discusses the relation between the behavioral and belief measures of AOT, their effects on 
accuracy and overconfidence. We specifically argue that while the belief measure of AOT 
assesses general AOT tendencies, the behavioral measure of AOT assesses task specific 
AOT behavior. The results show that considering alternative reasons increases subjects’ 
accuracy by lowering their overconfidence. We finally discuss our results from training 
adult population in AOT and suggest potential testing scenarios for our training module.  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MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ACTIVELY OPEN-MINDED 
THINKING 
In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how 
has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions 
and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said 
against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and 
upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, 
that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing 
the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every 
variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every 
character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; 
nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. 
— John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859 
 Actively open-minded thinking, a prominent theory of good thinking in judgment 
and decision making literature, describes a good thinker as someone who is not only fair 
to new information regardless of her preferred beliefs, but also as someone who seeks out 
new information to challenge her pet conclusions (Baron, 2008). Baron (1988) proposed 
this general framework to discuss thinking in terms of the thinker’s existing beliefs and 
goals, and how these goals and beliefs might affect one’s search of evidence and 
interpretation of the found evidence. This framework has its roots in the ideal thinking 
behavior described by John Stuart Mill (1859/1863) in On Liberty, but also drew on the 
work of Irvis L. Janis and colleagues on groupthink behavior (Janis, 1982; Herek, Janis, 
& Huth, 1987). Nickerson (1988) also talks about a similar approach to good thinking 
and calls it “fair mindedness.”  
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Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Intelligence 
 Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is a dispositional theory of good thinking. 
Dispositions are more malleable (see Baron, 1985 and Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993 for 
an in-depth discussion of dispositional theories of thinking), therefore posing a contrast 
with cognitive ability, which includes capacities that affect the performance in traditional 
psychometric intelligence tests.  
 Given the contrast drawn between dispositions and cognitive abilities, does it 
mean that AOT is different from intelligence? The answer to this question depends on 
how one defines intelligence. Many theorists find the common definition of intelligence 
restrictive (Baron, 1985; Perkins et al., 1993; Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich et al., 2013). 
Baron (1985) defined intelligence as general abilities that help people succeed in 
achieving their goals in various situations, which includes not only fixed cognitive 
abilities, but also thinking dispositions like AOT. Stanovich (2011), on the other hand, 
called for a separation of the narrower concept of intelligence from thinking dispositions. 
Both authors agree that AOT is a component of human rationality that is not captured 
well by traditional psychometric intelligence tests. 
 The difference of AOT from cognitive ability is suggested by several results. 
Stanovich and West (1997) showed that AOT predicted variance in an argument 
evaluation task about real life situations even after cognitive ability measures such as 
SAT scores and vocabulary test scores were partialled out. Similarly, Kokis et al. (2002) 
showed that even though cognitive ability was associated with analytic thought on 
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different tasks, AOT still explained the variance in analytic responding after variance 
shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. Sá et al. (2005) observed that while 
AOT predicted variance in subjects’ reiteration or elaboration of the original theory when 
the variance predicted by cognitive ability was controlled, cognitive ability failed to 
uniquely predict variance in reiteration of elaboration of the original theory when AOT 
was partialled out.  Argument types offered by subjects with high and low intelligence 1
was highly similar. Klaczynski (1997) looked at adolescents’ everyday reasoning and its 
relationship with cognitive ability and personal theories, and found similar results others 
observed with adults. While verbal ability was the best predictor of everyday reasoning, 
neither verbal ability nor other cognitive abilities predicted biases adolescents showed in 
everyday reasoning. Adolescents’ personal theories were the strongest predictors of biases 
in everyday reasoning.  
 Despite the evidence that AOT can account for different reasoning abilities that 
traditional intelligence tests cannot account for, there is a large literature that shows that 
intelligence is related to some belief biases in syllogistic reasoning tasks (e.g., Evans, 
2002). Additionally, Stanovich and West (1997) and Sá and Stanovich (2001) both found 
that the ability to avoid belief bias is predicted by cognitive ability. These results contrast 
with those observed by Klacynzski and colleagues (e.g., Klaczynski, 1997; Klacyznski & 
Gordon, 1996) where they found that reasoning was independent of cognitive ability.  
 However, analyses that partial out cognitive ability do not necessarily remove this variable, 1
because the measures of cognitive ability are not perfect, so we do not remove much of the 
variance by including cognitive ability measures in the models. Kahneman (1965) brought this 
problem to the attention of psychologists, but his argument was limited to problems of reliability. 
Westfall and Yarkoni (2016) also address the issue and propose a solution.
!3
The difference between these two sets of results seem to be due to the lack or presence of 
decontextualization requirements in the tasks (Sá et al., 2005; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 
2013). While subjects are directly instructed to ignore their favored beliefs in tasks such 
as syllogisms (Stanovich & West, 2008), in the informal reasoning tasks used by 
Klacynzki and colleagues, there is no direct instruction to decouple favored beliefs and 
biases from the reasoning process.  When subjects are instructed to keep their personal 2
opinions out of the reasoning process, this signals to them that decoupling is a necessary 
requirement of the reasoning task. This leads to the correlation observed between bias 
avoidance and cognitive ability, because different levels of cognitive abilities determine 
how successful subjects will be in decoupling their personal beliefs. Therefore, 
decoupling favored beliefs from reasoning results in correlations between cognitive 
ability and reasoning, while this relation becomes absent when subjects are not 
specifically instructed to do so. 
 AOT seems to be a related but different dimension of human rationality. Studies 
have shown that AOT predicts performance in informal reasoning tasks even after 
cognitive abilities are partialled out. Baron, Gürçay, and Metz (2016) argues that even if 
AOT is not properly part of intelligence, it affects measures of intelligence; and it is very 
likely that AOT itself is affected by cognitive abilities. They further argue that partialling 
out intelligence or IQ does not make much sense, as any higher correlation observed 
 See Stanovich et al. 2013 for a discussion of task differences and the correlation between 2
cognitive ability and reasoning.
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between AOT and a reasoning task than one between a reasoning task and IQ, just means 
that the reasoning task measures AOT better than IQ.  3
Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Other Individual Differences 
 Measures of AOT that currently exist in the literature are descendants of the 
dogmatism scale of Rokeach (1960), the need for cognition scale (NFC) of Cacioppo and 
Petty (1982),  and the Openness-Ideas and Values facets of the Revised NEO Personality 
Inventory of Costa and McCrae (1992). Baron, Gürçay, and Metz (2016) argues that the 
current measures of AOT and related personality measures such as Reflectivity/
Impulsivity (R/I) are not defined in terms of cognitive processes, but instead are defined 
in terms of where they fall in a multi-dimensional semantic space. It is possible to 
observe overlaps between AOT and other scales such as need for cognition and cognitive 
reflection.  
 For example, Baron et al. (2015) observed that the belief measure scale for AOT 
was correlated with performance on an extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Task 
(CRT) (Frederick, 2005) and R/I measures. They further argued that AOT is consistent 
with a disposition to question initial answers and to search thoroughly before giving a 
response, but it is the latter disposition that might be determining the relation between 
measures of CRT and AOT. Similarly, Campitelli and Labollita (2010) also showed that 
CRT includes more characteristics than Frederick (2005) proposed, and suggested that 
CRT is related to AOT. Kardash and Scholes (1996) observed that subjects who scored 
 Baron, Gürçay, and Metz (2016) also discusses the problem of statistical control in studying 3
correlations between different variables.
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highly on the NFC Scale were more likely to draw conclusions that reflected the 
inconclusive nature of the mixed evidence subjects read during the study. This study did 
not look at how AOT performed in the same task, but the fairness of evaluation high NFC 
subjects showed is also a disposition high AOT subjects have. 
 Despite the similarities between AOT and other individual differences, the overlap 
is not perfect, and there is evidence in literature that shows that certain judgment tasks are 
better at measuring AOT than others. Toplak, West, and Stanovich (2011) showed that 
CRT measure was the strongest predictor of subjects’ performance on heuristics-and-
biases tasks than measures of thinking dispositions, which included AOT. However, 
Haran, Ritov, and Mellers (2013) observed that AOT was the only reliable predictor of 
performance in an estimation task, even though AOT was positively correlated with NFC, 
CRT, and Openness to Experience from the Big Five personality dimensions (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). AOT seems to be correlated with other individual differences 
such as NFC, CRT, and R/I, but the predictiveness of these individual differences are 
dependent on the task characteristics. 
Measures of Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 Some measures of AOT are self-reports, where subjects are asked to report levels 
of agreement or disagreement with statements about how people should think (e.g., 
Stanovich & West, 1997). Other measures are behavioral, where researchers ask subjects 
to express their opinions on certain issues and assess myside bias, favoritism towards 
preexisting beliefs even in the face of conflicting new evidence (e.g., Perkins et al., 1986; 
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Baron, 1995); or other relevant biases to AOT such as belief overkill, the irrational 
tendency to interpret new evidence as supporting a favored opinion (Baron, 2009).  
Self-Report Measures 
 Baron (1991) argued that beliefs affect how people behave, and showed that 
assessment of beliefs can be a good measure of how people think (Baron, 1995). 
Stanovich and West (1997, 1998) devised an AOT subscale as part of a thinking 
dispositions questionnaire. Their design was influenced by the critical thinking literature 
(e.g., Nickerson, 1988; Perkins et al., 1993) but also by the work of Baron (1985, 1988). 
Their AOT scale is a composite of several scales. These were (1) Flexible Thinking scale, 
which taps into reflectivity, willingness to consider contradictory beliefs, willingness to 
consider alternative opinions and explanations, a tolerance for ambiguity, and willingness 
to postpone closure; (2) Openness-Ideas and (3) Openness-Values subscales from the 
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992); (4) Absolutism subscale, 
which was based on Perry’s (1970) stages of epistemological development in young 
adulthood; (5) Dogmatism subscale based on Rokeach’s (1960) Dogmatism scale; and (6) 
Categorical Thinking subscale, which borrowed three items from Epstein and Meier’s 
(1989) Constructive Thinking Inventory to assess black-and-white kind of thinking in 
subjects. To construct the AOT scale, the authors summed the scores on the Flexible 
Thinking, Openness-Ideas, and Openness-Values scales and subtracted the sum of the 
Absolutism, Dogmatism, and Categorical Thinking scales. Higher scores on this scale 
indicated flexibility in thinking and belief change, while lower scores indicated rigidity in 
!7
thinking and resistance to belief change. We should note that this scale was constructed to 
assess AOT specifically in college students. 
 Baron selected items from the AOT Scale of Stanovich and West and added other 
items to devise a short scale, which was appropriate for the general population to assess 
beliefs about thinking. This 7-item scale consists of statements that subjects indicate 
agreement or disagreement with on a 5-point scale. Some items on the scale are: 
“Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing argument is a sign of good character” 
and “It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear 
against them.” (The first 7 items on the AOT Scale in Table 1 are the original items from 
Baron’s AOT Scale.) 
 Both the long and short versions of the AOT Scale have been successful in 
predicting performance in other tasks as we mentioned in the previous section. However, 
these scales only assess beliefs about good thinking but not how people actually think. 
Additionally, Baron’s AOT Scale is weighted towards myside bias, irrational belief 
persistence, and inference. Baron et al. (2015) used an AOT Scale with an eighth item 
that also measured search. In the studies we report, we have added three more items to 
assess dispositions such as tendency to “keep an open mind” before prematurely settling 
on a conclusion and conduct proper amount of search that are also part of AOT. 
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Behavioral Measures 
 Most behavioral measures of AOT are designed to assess myside bias. These 
myside bias tasks ask subjects to list arguments on a given issue, and then experimenters 
score subjects’ arguments.  
 Stanovich and West (1997, 1998) developed a behavioral measure to evaluate 
myside bias called Argument Evaluation Test (AET) to evaluate such arguments. This test 
had 23 items. Subjects were tasked with evaluating a fictitious individual’s arguments. 
Each item began with a statement from the fictitious individual regarding a social issue 
such as, “The welfare system should be drastically cut back in size.” Subjects indicated 
how much they agree or disagree with this statement. The fictitious individual then 
offered a justification for his opinion such as, “The welfare system should be drastically 
reduced in size because welfare recipients take advantage of the system and buy 
expensive foods with their food stamps.” A critic then presented an argument against this 
justification such as, “Ninety-five percent of welfare recipients use their food stamps to 
obtain the bare essentials for their families.” Subjects were told to make the assumption 
that this counterargument was factually correct. Finally, the fictitious individual offered a 
rebuttal of the counterargument such as, “Many people who are on welfare are lazy and 
don’t want to work for a living.” Subjects were again told to assume that the rebuttal was 
factually correct, and then asked to evaluate the strength of the rebuttal offered by the 
fictitious character independent of their own opinions or beliefs. Subjects evaluations 
were then compared to a summary measure of eight expert judges. The expert judges 
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consisted of philosophy professors and the authors themselves. The authors estimated 
myside bias by trying to predict subjects’ ratings from both the expert judges’ ratings and 
the subjects’ preexisting opinions about the issue. Subjects who showed myside bias were 
those whose ratings of the rebuttal’s strength deviated from expert judges’ ratings and 
instead were in the direction of their preexisting opinions. 
 Similar methods were also used by Baron (1995) and Baron (2009). Baron (1995) 
assessed myside bias in thinking about abortion. Subjects were asked to prepare for a 
hypothetical class discussion on the topic “Are abortions carried out in the first day of 
pregnancy (e.g., by the “morning after” pill) morally wrong?” by generating a list of 
arguments. In a different study, the same subjects were also asked to evaluate arguments 
regarding abortion from fictitious students by grading them. The author classified the 
arguments generated by subjects as good or bad according to the justifications offered, 
and observed that many arguments had questionable warrants, showing that subjects 
made very little effort to look for evidence against their arguments. Baron (2009) 
developed a similar method to AET to examine belief overkill in political judgments. 
Subjects were asked to evaluate hypothetical candidates with conflicted positions on two 
different topics. For example, subjects saw the following on a page: 
Candidate 1 favors a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man 
and a woman and favors increased income taxes on those with high incomes, to 
reduce the deficit.  
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Candidate 2 opposes a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man 
and a woman and opposes increased income taxes on those with high incomes, to 
reduce the deficit.  
What is your position on the two candidates (assuming they both have equally 
acceptable positions on everything else you care about)?  
Strongly favor Candidate 1 — Favor Candidate 1 — Neutral — Favor Candidate 2 — 
Strongly favor Candidate 2  
What is the effect of the candidates’ position on a constitutional amendment defining 
marriage as between a man and a woman on your evaluation of the two candidates?  
Strongly favors Candidate 1 . . .  
[The same question was asked about the other issue.]  
The issues presented on each page were a combination of moral and non-moral issues. 
There were 6 moral and 6 non-moral issues, and subjects saw all combinations of these 
issues. Baron observed that the non-moral issue (income taxes in the example above) was 
affected by the subject’s stance on the moral issue (marriage equality in the example 
above). Additional behavioral measures have also been developed to assess myside bias 
and AOT in children (Baron et al. 1993) and adolescents (Kokis et al., 2002; Metz, 2016). 
 While these behavioral measures are more direct than self-assessments, they 
require a lot of items to derive a reliable AOT measure, and are usually scored by experts 
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and/or experimenters themselves. Additionally, the issues used in such argument tasks 
need to appeal to a wider population (and be age appropriate in the case of younger 
populations) such that people are familiar enough with these issues to have preexisting 
beliefs or opinions about them. 
Overview of the Present Chapter 
 In this chapter we report results from studies where we tested individual 
differences in AOT on probabilistic judgment tasks. We used a behavioral measure 
similar to the one used by Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) and Hoch (1985) in 
debiasing procedures, where subjects were asked to list reasons that was either for or 
against subjects’ pet beliefs. In the first three studies subjects made categorical 
predictions in almanac questions, while in the fourth study subjects made point and 
confidence interval estimates for numerical estimation questions. In all these studies 
subjects additionally wrote and classified the reasons they wrote as for their preferred 
answers or other options. This method allowed for an easier and simpler scoring of 
subjects’ reasoning on these tasks as compared to some of the other behavioral measures 
of AOT such as AET. We investigated whether this behavioral AOT measure would 
correlate with Baron’s AOT Belief Scale, subjects’ accuracy, defined as Brier scores, and 
confidence. We hypothesized that the behavioral AOT measure would correlate positively 
with AOT Belief Scale, and negatively with Brier scores, and expected subjects who 
scored high on the new behavioral measure to be less overconfident in their predictions 
than those who scored lower on this measure.  
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Studies 1A and 1B 
 The main purpose of this study was to investigate individual differences in AOT, 
with a focus on people’s ability to be able to come up with arguments against their 
favored judgments. Additionally, we tried to find questions from domains that would be 
familiar to our subjects, as two pilot studies revealed that some questions such as 
matrices and logic questions were too difficult for subjects to answer correctly (see 
Appendix A). Therefore, we picked two new domains: U.S. metropolitan area population 
and food content. We thought that these would be two domains where people would have 
a greater knowledge base compared to other questions asked in the pilot studies. This, in 
return, would give us a better idea regarding the individual differences in AOT and 
subjects’ ability to come up with arguments against their preferred judgments. Due to the 
number of questions we collected, we decided to split the questions into two sets, and test 
them on two different subject groups. Therefore, the method and results sections of these 
studies are reported together. 
Method 
 Subjects in Study 1A. Seventy-four subjects participated in the study. The 
subjects’ age ranged from 22 to 75 (Median = 50); 63.5% were female. The subjects were 
from a panel of about 1200 people who volunteered to do studies for pay on the Internet 
over the last 15 years, through advertising, links from various web sites, and word of 
mouth. They were mostly Americans, varying considerably in age, income, and education 
level, but with women over-represented. Subjects who did not take previous studies 
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seriously had been removed over the years. The panel was divided into three groups in 
order to use different samples for closely related studies. Subjects were paid $6 for 
participating in this study (through PayPal). A panel of 200 subjects were notified via 
email when the study was ready, and the study was removed when there were about 70 
responses, aiming for 80 subjects. 
 Subjects in Study 1B. Ninety-three subjects participated in the study. The 
subjects’ age ranged from 21 to 72 (Median = 49); 66.7% were female. The make-up of 
the subjects in this study were the same as those in Study 1A. Subjects were paid $6 for 
their participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects who did not receive an 
invitation to do Study 1A was notified by email when the study was ready, and the study 
was removed when there were about 90 subjects, aiming for 100.  
 Questions in Study 1A. Subjects answered 20 questions with three choice 
options A, B, and C in the same order. We used a fixed order in this study to reduce 
extraneous variance.The questions asked subjects which of the U.S. metropolitan areas 
was the largest one. The cities picked for the twenty questions came from a list on the 
Web (“Cities and metropolitan areas,” n. d.). Appendix B-1 lists the questions and 
answers presented to the subjects. 
 Questions in Study 1B. Subjects answered 20 questions with three choice options 
A, B, and C in the same order. The first quarter of the questions asked subjects to pick the 
food with the highest calorie content per serving; the second quarter of the questions 
asked subjects to pick the food with the most about of fiber content per 100 grams; the 
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third quarter of the questions asked subjects to pick the food with the highest fat content 
per 100 grams; and the last quarter of questions asked subjects to pick the food with the 
highest protein content per serving (see Appendix B-1 for a full list of questions). 
 Procedure. The procedures for both studies were similar with one exception, 
which we describe below. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. 
They first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions 
and the full studies can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/
args2c.html (Study 1A) and  http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args2f.html 
(Study 1B).  
 Subjects were told that they would be asked 20 questions, each with three possible 
answers A, B, and C. They were informed that we were interested in how they thought 
about answers. Once they read the instructions, they could enter their age, gender, and e-
mail address, and proceed with the study. Subjects answered one question on each page. 
On each page, they saw a short note defining metropolitan area and what the question 
was asking (see Appendix C-1). They were also given some example reasons. Below the 
short information the subjects saw the question with three options, and underneath that 
they were given six note spaces to list their reasons for and against their preferred answer. 
They were not required to use all six text input spaces but they had to write at least two 
reasons. In Study 1A, after listing reasons, they were asked to indicate their preferred 
answer, and then they were asked to state the probability that each of the three answers 
could be the correct answer. In Study 1B, subjects picked a preferred answer both before 
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and after they listed their reasons. The subjects were also given choices for probabilities 
to indicate their confidence in any answer option being correct, and were instructed to 
choose the one that was closest to what they think. In Study 1A, subjects assigned their 
probability judgments after they indicated their preferred answer, while in Study 1B, 
subjects assigned the probabilities after they were given a chance to change their 
preferred answer. The options for probability judgments were 0, 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60, 70, 90, 95, 99, and 100 (in percent). The subjects knew that 100% would mean they 
were completely certain that an answer was correct, but they would have a probability of 
33% being correct if they were guessing. The subjects were also informed on the 
instruction page that their probability judgments for the three answers would need to add 
up to about 100% (no less than 90% and not greater than 110% to allow for the limited 
set of options). After completing the page, they could move onto the the next page by 
clicking a button where they could classify their reasons as being for or against the choice 
options. Once they completed the classification task, they moved onto the next page, 
again by clicking a button, where they were presented with a new question and they 
repeated the same procedure for the remaining questions. The classifications of reasons 
were later checked by one of the authors (BG) to ensure that subjects’ reasons were 
classified correctly. 
 After answering all questions, the subjects were presented with an AOT scale (see 
Table 1). In this survey, subjects read eight statements regarding beliefs about thinking, 
and were asked to indicate their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale (1 = 
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completely agree, 5 = completely disagree). Once they completed the survey, they clicked 
a button to submit their responses. 
Summary and Discussion of Results 
 In Studies 1A and 1B we looked at individual differences in actively open-minded 
thinking as well as what kinds of questions might be suitable for studies to test the 
validity of a new actively open-minded measure based on subjects’ reasoning. We did not 
observe any correlations between the two AOT measures or between AOT-Beliefs and 
Brier scores. We observed a correlation between AOT-Reasons and Brier scores.  
 One surprising result we observed in Study 1B was that the correlation between 
AOT-Reasons and Brier scores strengthened as the question difficulty increased. We 
additionally found partial support for the effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier 
scores, and ran additional linear mixed-effect models to understand our results further. 
Linear mixed-effect models showed an interaction between AOT-Reasons and subjects’ 
answering questions correctly, but AOT-Reasons had no effect on subjects’ answering 
questions correctly. Additionally, when subjects were incorrect, higher scores on AOT-
Reasons were associated with lower Brier scores (hence better), but when subjects were 
correct, higher AOT-Reasons were associated with higher Brier scores. Our analyses 
failed to show any effect of AOT-Beliefs on subjects’ Brier scores.  
 We assessed the relations between overconfidence and AOT measures by two 
different overconfidence measures. The first measure compared subjects’ probability 
judgments for their preferred answers to the percentage of questions they answered 
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correctly. The second overconfidence measure used Brier scores but was also loosely 
analogous to the first overconfidence measure. The correlational tests using these 
different overconfidence measures yielded similar results. We observed no statistically 
significant correlations between AOT-Reasons and the overconfidence measures in Study 
1A, while we did in Study 1B. AOT-Beliefs scores showed no statistically significant 
correlations with either overconfidence measure. The second overconfidence measure 
allowed us to run linear mixed-effect models. We found supporting evidence for our 
hypothesis that higher scores on AOT-Reasons are associated with lower overconfidence. 
 Even though these studies showed promise in terms of measuring AOT 
behaviorally, the two different domains the questions came from showed differences in 
degrees of difficulty, and some of our results appeared to be inconsistent between these 
two datasets. Therefore, going forward, we decided to systematically select the questions 
to ask subjects rather than assessing the difficulty of questions in hindsight. Next we 
discuss the results summarized here in more detail. 
Results 
 Since the experimental designs for studies 1A and 1B were identical except for 
the topics of the questions, we present the results of these studies together. 
Individual Differences Measures for Actively Open Minded Thinking 
 We looked at two measures to assess individual differences in AOT. The first 
measure was constructed by looking at the responses subjects gave on the AOT scale, 
which we call AOT-Beliefs. Subjects’ responses were on a 1 to 5 scale, where higher 
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numbers meant more actively open-minded thinking except for the reverse-scored items, 
4 through 7. First we subtracted subjects’ responses from 3 so that their responses now 
varied between -2 and 2. Then we took the arithmetic mean of the 8 items for each 
subject to come up with an AOT scale measure for each subject. The subjects’ AOT-
Beliefs scores ranged from -0.750 to 1.75 in Study 1A (M1A = 0.672, SD1A = 0.630), and 
from -1.454 to 1.727 in Study 1B (M1B = 0.748, SD1B = 0.545). 
 Next we calculated a new measure by looking at the reasons subjects listed for 
each question, which we call AOT-Reasons. According to this measure, subjects gained 1 
point for giving a reason that is for an option other than their preferred option or a reason 
that is against their preferred option. They did not get any points for giving a reason that 
supports their preferred option. The subjects’ mean AOT-Reasons scores ranged from 
0.00 to 1.90 in Study 1A (M1A = 0.276, SD1A = 0.415), while they ranged from 0.00 to 
1.45 in Study 1B (M1B = 0.332, SD1B = 0.355). A Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
testing whether the two individual differences measures were positively correlated 
showed a negative and statistically non-significant correlation between these two 
measures in both studies (r = -0.18, t(72) = -1.52, p = 0.13, two-tailed, in Study 1A; r = 
-0.09, t(91) = -0.83, p = 0.41, two-tailed, in Study 1B). 
 We did not observe a correlation between subjects’ mean Brier scores and AOT-
Beliefs in either study, r = -0.02, t(67) = -0.2, p = 0.84, two-tailed, in Study 1A; r = 0.05, 
t(90) = 0.47, p = 0.64, two-tailed, in Study 1B. We next hypothesized that the greater the 
mean AOT-Reasons scores are, the lower the mean Brier scores would be, and found 
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some support for it,  r = -0.18, t(67)= -1.53, p = 0.07, one-tailed, in Study 1A; r = -0.27, 
t(90)= -2.66, p = 0.01, one-tailed, in Study 1B. A recent study found AOT to be 
associated with lower overconfidence (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013). Given that Brier 
scores uses subjects’ probability judgment accuracy in its calculation, it is possible that 
the way AOT benefits subjects is by lowering their extreme confidence judgments. Then, 
this mechanism should be most beneficial in cases where subjects pick wrong answers, 
namely difficult questions. Therefore, we looked at how the correlation between Brier 
scores and mean AOT-Reasons behaved as the question difficulty varied. While we did 
not observe a statistically significant correlation in Study 1A, the correlation was in the 
expected direction, r = -0.28, t(18)= -1.22, p = 0.24, two-tailed. In Study 1B, we observed 
that as the questions got more difficult, the correlation between Brier scores and AOT 
reasoning got stronger, r = -0.56, t(18) = -2.89, p = 0.01, two-tailed. 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We used the lmer() function in the lme4 package 
in R (Bates et al., 2014) to look at the effects of AOT-Reasons and AOT-Beliefs on 
subjects’ Brier scores. We first regressed the Brier scores of subjects on AOT-Reasons 
with subjects and items as crossed random effects. We observed no effect of the measure 
on subjects’ Brier scores in Study 1A, but the sign of the coefficient was in the right 
direction (-0.009, 95% c.i. -0.043 to 0.025, Wald method). However, in Study 1B, the 
same analysis showed an effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier scores (-0.030, 95% 
c.i. -0.058 to -0.002, Wald method). Thus, we found partial support for our hypothesis 
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that people who write more reasons that go against their preferred options have lower 
Brier scores.  
 One reason why we did not observe any effect of AOT-Reasons in the first round 
could be that the usefulness of considering alternative reasons might be dependent on 
whether the correct answer is known. If a subject knows the correct answer, they might 
not feel the need to list alternative reasons. To test this hypothesis we first regressed the 
Brier scores of subjects on AOT-Reasons and Correct (whether subjects guessed the 
answer correctly where 1 = correct and 0 = incorrect with subjects and items as crossed 
random effects). AOT-Reasons on its own had no effect on subjects’ Brier scores in either 
study (-0.012, 95% c.i. -0.038 to 0.014, Wald method; -0.001, 95% c.i. -0.023 to 0.019, 
Wald method), and as it would be expected Correct did have an effect on the Brier scores 
in both studies (-0.368, 95% c.i. -0.383 to -0.353, Wald method; -0.439, 95% c.i. -0.454 
to -0.424, Wald method). We also observed an interaction effect of AOT-Reasons and 
Correct on the Brier scores in both studies (0.099, 95% c.i. 0.081 to 0.118, Wald method; 
0.201, 95% c.i. 0.148 to 0.255, Wald method), showing that the effect of AOT-Reasons 
on Brier scores is dependent on whether subjects answered the questions correctly or not.  
 To get a better understanding of what is going on, we split our data into two based 
on whether subjects guessed a specific question correctly or incorrectly. For each dataset, 
we regressed subjects’ Brier scores on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed 
random effects. The results showed a good effect when subjects guessed the question 
incorrectly such that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower Brier scores 
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in both studies (-0.086, 95% c.i. -0.134 to -0.038, Wald method; -0.099, 95% c.i. -0.153 
to -0.044, Wald method).  However, when subjects answered the question correctly, we 4
observed a bad effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier scores such that higher AOT-
Reasons scores were associated with higher Brier scores. While this effect was not 
statistically significant in Study 1A (0.029, 95% c.i. -0.026 to 0.085, Wald method), it 
was statistically significant in Study 1B (0.056, 95% c.i. 0.023 to 0.089, Wald method).  5
Finally, we ran a generalized linear mixed-effect model to determine any effect of AOT-
Reasons on Correct but we did not observe any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct in 
either study (-0.071, 95% c.i. -0.399 to 0.258, Wald method; 0.020, 95% c.i. -0.280 to 
0.321, Wald method).  It seems that subjects’ being correct on a given question is not 6
dependent upon subjects’ AOT-Reasons scores. These analyses explain the strengthening 
of the correlation between Brier scores and AOT-Reasons scores as the difficulty of 
questions increases. Since subjects are more likely to answer difficult questions wrong, 
writing more alternative reasons as to why their preferred option might be wrong lowers 
their Brier scores.  
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 4
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct<0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for incorrectly answered questions.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 5
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct>0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for correctly answered questions.
 The generalized lmer model in R was glmer((Correct+1)/2 ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C), d1 , family 6
= “binomial”), where Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1 is the data frame used.
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 An additional linear mixed-effect model analysis showed that AOT-Beliefs did not 
have an effect on the Brier scores (-0.006, 95% c.i. -0.069 to 0.056, Wald method, in 
Study 1A; 0.017, 95% c.i. -0.053 to 0.087, Wald method, in Study 1B). 
A New Confidence Measure for Three-Choice Questions 
 In binary judgment tasks such as yes/no forecasting questions, subject assigns two 
probabilities, one for success and one for failure. If success is 1 and failure is 0, then 
subject’s expected score is her judged probability of success, or her confidence. The way 
we usually assess subject’s confidence is by comparing her confidence or probability of 
success to her actual score, which is the percentage of questions she answered correctly.  
 In our case, the probability judgment tasks require subjects to assign three 
probabilities, one of which is implied by the other two. Thus, subjects can be 
overconfident in giving a probability that is too high to the wrong answer, or one that is 
too low for the correct answer. Given this, we wanted to calculate subjects’ confidence 
such that the measure would consider all three probabilities assigned by the subjects. 
Going along with the idea that confidence is the expected probability of success, we 
thought we could calculate confidence by what we call the Expected Brier Score (EBS). 
We now explain how to calculate this score: 
Let x, y, and z be the probabilities the subject assigns to each option on a three-choice 
question.Then, 
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Thus,  x(1-x)2 is the component for x if x is true, which has a probability of x; and (1-x)x2 
is the component for x if x is false, which has a probability of (1-x), and so on. 
 To assess subject’s confidence, we compare EBS to her actual Brier score. If the 
subject is appropriately confident, then the mean of this confidence measure will equal 
the subject’s mean Brier Score. If the mean EBS score is lower than the mean of the 
subject’s Brier score, then we say that the subject is overconfident. Thus, we calculate the 
overconfidence a subject shows by subtracting the mean EBS from the mean Brier Score. 
Therefore, this new overconfidence measure, which we will refer to as Over2, is loosely 
analogous to the more widely-used overconfidence measure we described above.   The 7
advantage of this measure is that it provides a measure for each response, and uses all 
three probability judgments the subject makes.  
 In the correlations we ran, we used both the widely-used overconfidence measure 
(Over1 from now on) and our new measure, Over2. Both of these measures showed that 
 The new measure of overconfidence is sensible but not equivalent to the more commonly used 7
overconfidence measures. We can make such a comparison in the case where there are only two 
outcomes (e.g., yes/no) for a given question. Let’s assume that P is the subject’s probability 
judgment of an answer being correct. By using the formula for EBS given above, the EBS for a 
judgment of P is 2P*(1-P). That is, a proportion P of the outcomes are true, and if this happens, 
the Brier Score is 2*(1-P)2, and a proportion of 1-P are false, and if that happens, the Brier Score 
is 2P2. Thus, the EBS is 2P*(1-P)2 + 2(1-P)*P2, and this simplifies to 2P*(1-P). We can ignore the 
2 coefficient as it is a result of the symmetry, and assume that our formula is P*(1-P). Next, let’s 
assume that Q is the actual proportion of cases like this that are correct. Then, the actual Brier 
Score is 2Q*(1-P)2 + (1-Q)*2P2. We can again drop the 2 coefficient, and simplify the formula to 
Q-2QP + P2. Then the overconfidence measure, actual Brier Score minus EBS, is (1-2P)*(Q-P). 
The corresponding ordinary overconfidence measure is Q-P. The (1-2P) could be written as 2(0.5-
P), and it comes from the fact that probabilities below 0.5 should never happen while predicting 
the probability of something being true, because they should be inverted. But this means that the 
function is relatively flat near P = 0.5, compared to the usual overconfidence measure of P-Q. For 
example, if a person is overconfident half the time by 10% (by the standard measure), and 
underconfident half the time by 10%, the mean will be greater than 0. However, this is still 
acceptable for the purpose of asking whether AOT reduces overconfidence, as the same measure 
is used everywhere.
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on average subjects are overconfident in their probability judgments (Study 1A: MOver1 = 
0.18; MOver2 = 0.43; Study 1B: MOver1 = 0.30; MOver2 = 0.55). 
 We ran a correlation to see whether lower overconfidence was associated with 
higher numbers of reasons that went against subjects’ preferred option. We observed a 
statistically significant correlation between Over1 and AOT-Reasons only in Study 1B. 
The correlation coefficient with Over1 as the overconfidence measure was -0.06, t(67) = 
-0.51, p = 0.31, one-tailed, in Study 1A; while in Study 1B, the correlation coefficient 
was -0.24, t(90) = -2.35, p = 0.01, one-tailed. Using Over2 as the overconfidence 
measure, we observed a correlation between Over2 and AOT-Reasons in both studies, but 
only in Study 1B this relation was statistically significant. The correlation coefficient for 
this test in Study 1A was -0.20, t(67) = -1.66, p = 0.051, one-tailed; while in Study 1B the 
correlation coefficient was -0.30, t(90) = -3.02, p = 0.002, one-tailed. 
 We additionally looked at the correlation between AOT-Beliefs and the 
overconfidence measures. In Study 1A the correlation coefficient between AOT-Beliefs 
and Over1 was 0.09,  t(67) = 0.73, p = 0.77, one-tailed ; and in Study 1B the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables was 0.10,  t(90) = 0.94, p = 0.82, one-tailed. 
There was no correlation between Over1 and AOT-Beliefs in either study. When we ran 
the same correlations with Over2, we again observed no correlation between AOT-Beliefs 
and overconfidence in either study (r = 0.02, t(67) = 0.15, p = 0.88, two-tailed, for Study 
1A; r = 0.06, t(90) = 0.57, p = 0.57, two-tailed, for Study 1B). 
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 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We ran linear mixed-effect models to see whether 
number of against reasons had an effect on subjects’ confidence ratings. Our new 
overconfidence measure, Over2, can be computed on a single trial, thus we regressed 
Over2 on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random effects. In both sets of 
data Over2 was lower when AOT-Reasons was higher (-0.034, 95% c.i. -0.067 to -0.001, 
Wald method, for Study 1A; -0.045, 95% c.i. -0.074 to -0.017, Wald method, for Study 
1B), meaning that if subjects wrote more reasons that go against their preferred option, 
they were less overconfident. However, we did not observe an effect of AOT-Beliefs on 
Over2 in Study 1A (0.007, 95% c.i. -0.079 to 0.093, Wald method) or in Study 1B (0.029, 
95% c.i. -0.072 to 0.130). 
 We also regressed subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred answer (Prob 
from now on) on AOT-Reasons with items and subjects as crossed random effects.  We 8
observed a statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Prob in both studies such 
that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower probability judgments 
(-0.044, 95% c.i. -0.069 to -0.019, Wald method; -0.048, 95% c.i. -0.069 to -0.028, Wald 
method). A linear mixed-effect model regressing Prob on AOT-Reasons and Correct with 
items and subjects as crossed random effects showed an effect of AOT-Reasons on Prob 
in both studies (-0.044, 95% c.i. -0.069 to -0.019, Wald method; -0.048, 95% c.i. -0.069 
to -0.028, Wald method) and no effect of Correct on Prob in either study (0.002, 95% c.i. 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|S),d1), where Ar is AOT-8
Reasons, C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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-0.003 to 0.008, Wald method; -0.001, 95% c.i. -0.007 to 0.005, Wald method).   While 9
scoring high on AOT-Reasons was associated with lower probability judgments for 
preferred answers, no associations were observed between answering questions correctly 
and subjects’ probability judgments for preferred answers.  
Study 2 
 In this study we aimed to study individual differences in actively open-minded 
thinking, and more specifically, investigate people’s ability to list reasons against their 
preferred answer. 
Method 
 Subjects. Eighty-six subjects participated in the study. The subjects’ age ranged 
from 19 to 75 (Median = 46.5); 67.4% were female. The make-up of the subjects in this 
study were the same as those in previous studies. Subjects were paid $6 for their 
participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects was notified by email when 
the study was ready, and the study was removed when there were about 85 subjects, 
aiming for 90.  
 Questions. Subjects answered 20 questions with three answer options A, B, and C 
in the same randomized order. The questions came from the pool of questions used in 
Study Pilot Study 2 (see Appendix A), and were picked as described in the results section 
of that study. A full list of questions and answers along with their difficulty and 
discrimination scores can be found in Appendix B-1.  
 The lmer function in R for this model was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Correct + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|S),d1), 9
where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args4.html.  
 The procedure for this study was similar to that of Study 1B with a small change 
to the AOT scale that was used. At the end of the task, subjects were given an AOT scale 
but this time the scale had three new additional items, making it an 11-item scale (α = 
0.82, see Table 2). These items were added because the 8-item AOT scale was weighted 
towards inference but did not have enough items regarding information search and 
keeping an open-mind. As in the previous studies, the classifications of reasons were 
checked by one of the authors (BG) after the data collection was complete to ensure that 
subjects’ reasons were classified correctly. 
Summary and Discussion of Results 
 In this study we attempted to measure individual differences based on subjects’ 
reasoning, and testing the effect of actively open-minded thinking on subjects’ Brier 
scores and overconfidence. We did not observe any significant relations between different 
measures of AOT or between AOT measures and overconfidence. There was also no 
correlation between Brier scores and AOT-Reasons scores, but we did observe a 
statistically significant correlation between AOT-Beliefs and Brier scores. We were also 
surprised that the correlation between question difficulty and the coefficients for the 
correlation between mean Brier scores and AOT-Reasons showed a small-to-medium but 
statistically non-significant correlation. The relation we observed between question 
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difficulty and the correlation between mean Brier scores and AOT-Reasons did not exist 
in this study.  
 Linear mixed-effect models we ran to understand the relations between AOT-
Reasons, Brier scores, and subjects’ correctness on questions showed that an interaction 
between AOT-Reasons and subjects’ answering questions correctly predicted subjects’ 
Brier scores. Additionally, we observed a marginally significant good effect of AOT-
Reasons on Brier scores when subjects answered questions incorrectly, but a bad effect of 
AOT-Reasons on Brier scores when subjects were correct. Specifically, when subjects 
were incorrect, higher scores on AOT-Reasons were associated with lower Brier scores, 
but when subjects were correct, higher AOT-Reasons were associated with higher Brier 
scores. Our analyses failed to show any effect of AOT-Beliefs on subjects’ Brier scores. 
 Looking at subjects’ reasons showed us that many subjects wrote either irrelevant 
comments such as “Salad is tasty” while answering calorie/nutrition questions or said “I 
don’t know.” We excluded these comments while calculating the AOT-Reasons , but 10
maybe some of these comments should have been included. Comments like “I don’t 
know” might indicate useful information such as confidence in an answer, and even 
irrelevant comments might tell us something in terms of subjects’ thinking process such 
as searching for evidence. AOT-Reasons as it stands now has this potential weakness. 
However, Figure 1 shows that the relation we observed in the previous studies still exists. 
When the questions are more difficult, the correlation between the Brier scores and AOT-
 When we ran the same statistical tests with the original coding of the subjects, some results 10
were statistically significant.
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Reasons scores are negative for these questions, which is what we observed before. 
Given this and the additional analyses we ran, it seems that this result seems believable: 
people who think in a more open-minded manner have lower Brier scores on really 
difficult items. 
 We additionally ran linear mixed-effect models to see whether AOT-Reasons 
predicted subjects’ overconfidence or the probabilities they assigned to their preferred 
answers. We observed no effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ overconfidence, but we 
observed a statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ probability 
judgment for their preferred answers. Specifically, higher number of reasons against 
preferred answers predicted lower probability judgments for preferred answers. Writing 
reasons against subjects’ preferred reasons seem to decrease subjects’ confidence in their 
answers. Similar analyses with AOT-Beliefs as the independent variable did not show a 
statistically significant effect of this variable on subjects’ overconfidence. Next, we 
describe the statistical analyses and results in more detail. 
Results 
 Since this study was identical in design to Studies 1A and 1B, we ran the same 
tests to analyze the data. 
Individual Differences Measures for Actively Open Minded Thinking 
 We used two AOT measures, AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons, to look at 
individual differences in AOT as we did in Studies 1A and 1B. We calculated AOT-
Beliefs as we did in the previous studies, but this time we had three additional items. 
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Subjects’ responses were on a 1 to 5 scale, where higher numbers meant more actively 
open-minded thinking except for reverse-scored items. First we subtracted subjects’ 
responses from 3 so that their responses now varied between -2 and 2. Items 4 through 7 
and 9 on the scale were reverse-scored, and then we took the arithmetic mean of the 11 
items for each subject to come up with an AOT scale measure for each subject. The 
subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores ranged from -0.909 to 1.727 (M = 0.697, SD = 0.597). We 
calculated AOT-Reasons the same way we did in previous studies. The subjects’ mean 
AOT-Reasons scores ranged from 0.00 to 1.30 (M = 0.247, SD = 0.278). The correlation 
between AOT-Beliefs and mean AOT-Reasons was 0.08, and was not statistically 
significant t(84) = 0.76, p = 0.45, two-tailed.  
 There was a small correlation between mean Brier scores and AOT-Beliefs, 
showing that people who had lower Brier scores measured higher on AOT-Beliefs, r = 
-0.19, t(84) = -1.75, p = 0.04, one-tailed. We expected that higher mean AOT-Reasons 
scores would be correlated with lower mean Brier scores, but this hypothesis was not 
supported, r = -0.04, t(84)= -0.4, p = 0.35, one-tailed. Additionally, we looked at how the 
correlation between Brier scores and mean AOT-Reasons behaved as the question 
difficulty varied. We observed a small-to-medium but not statistically significant 
correlation in the expected direction, r = -0.24, t(18)= -1.04, p = 0.31, two-tailed. Our 
hypothesis that as the questions get more difficult, the correlation between Brier scores 
and AOT reasoning get stronger, was not supported. 
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 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We ran linear mixed-effect models to assess the 
effect of actively open-minded measures on subjects’ Brier scores. We first regressed 
Brier scores on AOT-Beliefs scores and did not observe any effect of AOT-Beliefs on 
Brier scores even though the sign of the estimate coefficient was in the correct direction 
(-0.065, 95% c.i. -0.139 to 0.008, Wald method). Next we regressed the Brier scores of 
subjects on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random effects. We 
observed an effect of the measure on subjects’ Brier scores (0.044, 95% c.i. 0.012 to 
0.077, Wald method); however, this effect was in the opposite direction of the hypothesis. 
According to this analysis, higher numbers of reasons that go against subjects’ preferred 
answers were associated with higher Brier scores.  This reverse association probably 
resulted from reverse causality, when one thinks of more reasons against their hypothesis 
because it is more likely to be wrong. Good thinking here was probably not much help, 
because subjects were still highly limited by their knowledge base.  
 We additionally regressed the Brier scores of subjects on AOT-Reasons and 
Correct (whether subjects guessed the answer correctly where 1 = correct and 0 = 
incorrect with subjects and items as crossed random effects). AOT-Reasons had an effect 
on subjects’ Brier scores but it was in the opposite direction from what we would have 
expected (0.025, 95% c.i. 0.003 to 0.047, Wald method), and as it would be expected 
Correct did have an effect on the Brier scores (-0.449, 95% c.i. -0.463 to -0.435, Wald 
method). We also observed an interaction effect of AOT-Reasons and Correct on the Brier 
scores (0.058, 95% c.i. 0.038 to 0.079, Wald method).  
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 To get a better understanding of what is going on, we split our data into two based 
on whether subjects guessed a specific question correctly or incorrectly. For each dataset, 
we regressed subjects’ Brier scores on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed 
random effects. The results showed a good effect when subjects guessed the question 
incorrectly such that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower Brier scores, 
but it was not statistically significant (-0.052, 95% c.i. -0.119 to 0.015, Wald method).  11
However, when subjects answered the question correctly, we observed a bad effect of 
AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier scores such that higher AOT-Reasons scores were 
associated with higher Brier scores (0.052, 95% c.i. 0.013 to 0.091, Wald method).  12
Finally, we ran a generalized linear mixed-effect model to determine any effect of AOT-
Reasons on Correct but we did not observe any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct 
(-0.220, 95% c.i. -0.632 to 0.193, Wald method). It seems that subjects’ being correct on a 
given question is not dependent upon subjects’ AOT-Reasons scores. These analyses help 
us understand why we observe the strengthening of the correlation between Brier scores 
and AOT-Reasons scores as the difficulty of questions increases. Since subjects are more 
likely to answer difficult questions wrong, writing more alternative reasons as to why 
their preferred option might be wrong lowers their Brier scores.   
Overconfidence and Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 11
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct<0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for incorrectly answered questions.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 12
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct>0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for correctly answered questions.
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 We assessed the relation between overconfidence and AOT measures by using 
two overconfidence measures as we did in Studies 1A and 1B. For both measures, the 
mean overconfidence scores were positive, meaning that subjects were overconfident in 
their probability judgments (MOver1 = 0.15; MOver2 = 0.39).  
 We hypothesized that higher scores on AOT-Reasons would be associated with 
lower overconfidence. The correlation between AOT-Reasons and the widely-used 
overconfidence measure, Over1, was not statistically significant,  r = -0.06, t(84) = -0.58, 
p = 0.28, one-tailed. The correlation between AOT-Reasons and Over2 was not 
statistically significant either, r = -0.10, t(84) = -0.88, p = 0.19, one-tailed. We 
additionally looked at the correlations between AOT-Beliefs and overconfidence 
measures, but observed no correlations between AOT-Beliefs and either overconfidence 
measure, r = -0.08, t(84) = -0.77, p = 0.22, one-tailed (with Over1 as the overconfidence 
measure); r = -0.08, t(84) = -0.73, p = 0.23, one-tailed (with Over2 as the overconfidence 
measure). 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We regressed Over2 on AOT-Reasons with 
subjects and items as crossed random effects. Similar to our results in Pearson’s product-
moment correlations, we did not observe a significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Over2 
(0.021, 95% c.i. -0.009 to 0.052, Wald method). Similarly, we regressed Over2 on AOT-
Beliefs, and did not observe a significant effect of AOT-Beliefs on Over2 even though the 
effect was in the expected direction (-0.032, 95% c.i. -0.117 to 0.053). In conclusion, 
there was no effect of the AOT measures on subjects’ overconfidence. 
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 We also regressed subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred answer (Prob 
from now on) on AOT-Reasons with items and subjects as crossed random effects.  We 13
observed a statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Prob such that higher AOT-
Reasons scores were associated with lower probability judgments (-0.050, 95% c.i. 
-0.072 to -0.027, Wald method). A linear mixed-effect model regressing Prob on AOT-
Reasons and Correct with items and subjects as crossed random effects showed an effect 
of AOT-Reasons (-0.048, 95% c.i. -0.070 to -0.026, Wald method) and an effect of 
Correct on Prob (0.027, 95% c.i. 0.020 to 0.033, Wald method).   Scoring high on AOT-14
Reasons was associated with lower probability judgments for preferred answers, and 
answering questions correctly was associated with higher probability judgments for 
preferred answers.  
Study 3 
 The aim of this study was to study individual differences in actively open-minded 
thinking by using numerical questions. 
Method 
 Subjects. Eighty-two subjects participated in the study. The subjects’ age ranged 
from 19 to 75 (Median = 50); 67% were female. The make-up of the subjects in this study 
were the same as those in previous studies. Subjects were paid $8 for their participation 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|S),d1), where Ar is AOT-13
Reasons, C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
 The lmer function in R for this model was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Correct + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|14
S),d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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(through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects was notified by email when the study 
was ready, and the study was removed when we had about 100 subjects. 
 Questions. Subjects answered 25 questions in randomized order. The questions 
came from the pool of questions used in Pilot Study 3, and were picked as described in 
the results section of that study. A full list of questions and answers along with their 
difficulty and discrimination scores can be found in Appendix B-1.  
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args7.html.  
 Each subject answered 25 questions in an order randomized for each subject. 
Subjects saw one question on each page and were asked to submit their best estimate, a 
lower and an upper number to give them a range so that they would be correct 90% of the 
time. After subjects put in the three values, they were asked to list at least two reasons 
that affected their answer and classify each one. They could say their argument was about 
“why my answer makes sense”, “why it could be too high”, “why it could be too low”,  
“why it could be too low or too high”, or “none of the above.” Upon completion of this 
stage, they were given the opportunity to adjust their estimates if they chose to do so. The 
subjects repeated this procedure for all the questions, and then took the AOT scale (see 
Table 2). As in the previous studies, the classifications of reasons were checked by one of 
the authors (BG) after the data collection was complete to ensure that subjects’ reasons 
were classified correctly. 
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Summary and Discussion of Results 
 This study tried to replicate the results of the previous studies with numerical 
questions. We observed some discrepancy between our results in this study and previous 
ones. Earlier studies showed no correlation between the two AOT measures, but in this 
study we observed a significant correlation in the hypothesized direction. Additionally, 
higher AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower error scores if 
the error scores were based on confidence interval judgments, but this correlation 
disappeared if the error scores were calculated by using subjects’ best estimates.  Finally, 
linear mixed-effect analyses did not show any effect of the AOT measures on either 
accuracy score. 
Results 
 In Pilot Study 3, we tested two potential accuracy scores called Overconf and 
CIscore (see Appendix A, pages 117-120 for an in-depth discussion of these scores). We 
decided that Overconf was a more suitable measure for calculating accuracy than CIscore 
since we are primarily interested in overconfidence, so for the analyses where we wanted 
to look at the effects of AOT on accuracy scores from subjects’ confidence interval 
judgments, we used Overconf rather than CIscore. We additionally used another accuracy 
score called Besterror, which considered subjects’ best point estimate for a given question 
while calculating error scores.   15
 See Pilot Study 3 for an in-depth discussion of Besterror accuracy score.15
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Individual Differences Measures for Actively Open Minded Thinking 
 The subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores ranged from -0.909 to 1.727 (M = 0.542, SD = 
0.540), while their mean AOT-Reasons scores ranged from 0.00 to 0.98 (M = 0.043, SD = 
0.267). We expected that the mean of AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons would be positively 
correlated, and our hypothesis was supported, r = 0.27, t(80) = 2.53, p = 0.01, two-tailed.  
 We observed no correlation between AOT-Beliefs scores and mean Besterror 
scores, r = -0.14, t(80) = - 1.28, p = 0.10, one-tailed. Next we looked at the relation 
between AOT-Beliefs and Overconf, expecting that higher AOT-Beliefs scores would be 
associated with lower Overconf scores. This hypothesis was not supported. We observed 
no correlation between these two variables, r = -0.01, t(80) = -0.05, p = 0.48, one-tailed. 
We  next wanted to see whether higher mean AOT-Reasons scores would be associated 
with lower mean Besterror scores, but found no support for this association, r = -0.11, 
t(80)= -1.02, p = 0.15, one-tailed. However, we observed a statistically significant 
negative correlation between mean Overconf scores and mean AOT-Reasons scores such 
that higher number of against reasons were associated with better accuracy, r = -0.25, 
t(80) = -2.29, p = 0.01, one-tailed. In previous experiments we looked at how the 
correlation between Brier scores and mean AOT-Reasons behaved as the question 
difficulty varied. We could potentially run a similar analysis using Besterror or Overconf 
to replace Brier scores, but we think that it is not very appropriate to do that in this task. 
Question difficulty is reflected in the subjects’ intervals in this study, but in the previous 
studies, which used categorical answers rather than numerical estimates, many subject 
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errors were the result of guesses based on irrelevant information due to lack of 
knowledge in question domains. Therefore, these errors sometimes led to below-chance 
judgments. Given this, we were not able to run a similar test. 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We wanted to look at the effect of AOT-Reasons 
on the subjects’ accuracy scores based on their best estimate (Besterror) and confidence 
interval judgments (Overconf). We first regressed Besterror on AOT-Reasons with 
subjects and items as crossed random effects. We observed no effect of the measure on 
subjects’ Besterror scores (-0.002, 95% c.i. -0.038 to 0.043, Wald method).  Next, we 
regressed Overconf on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random effects 
again. Once again, we did not observe any effect of AOT-Reasons on the accuracy score 
(-0.008, 95% c.i. -0.027 to 0.011, Wald method). 
 Additionally, we looked at the effect of AOT-Beliefs on the subjects’ accuracy 
scores based on their Besterror and Overconf scores. We crossed each accuracy score on 
subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores with subjects and items as crossed random effects, and did 
not find any effect of the mean of AOT-Beliefs on either accuracy score (For Besterror as 
the dependent variable the estimate was -0.066, 95% c.i. -0.159 to 0.028, Wald method; 
for Overconf as the dependent variable the estimate was -0.002, 95% c.i. -0.071 to 0.067, 
Wald method).  
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Table 1.The following table shows the Actively Open-Minded Scale presented to subjects 
for Studies 1A and 1B. Questions 4, 5, 6, and 7 are reverse coded. 
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1 Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing argument is a sign of 
good character.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
2 People should take into consideration evidence that goes against their 
beliefs.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
3 People should revise their beliefs in response to new information or 
evidence.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
4 Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
5 Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
6 It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence 
brought to bear against them.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
7 One should disregard evidence that conflicts with one's established 
beliefs.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
8 People should search actively for reasons why their beliefs might be 
wrong.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
Table 2. The following table shows the Actively Open-Minded Scale presented to 
subjects starting in Study 2. Questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 are reverse coded. 
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1 Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing argument is a sign of 
good character.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
2 People should take into consideration evidence that goes against their 
beliefs.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
3 People should revise their beliefs in response to new information or 
evidence.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
4 Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
5 Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
6 It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence 
brought to bear against them.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
7 One should disregard evidence that conflicts with one's established 
beliefs.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
8 People should search actively for reasons why their beliefs might be 
wrong.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
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9 When we are faced with a new question, the first answer that occurs 
to us is usually best.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
10 When faced with a new question, we should consider more than one 
possible answer before reaching a conclusion.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
11 When faced with a new question, we should look for reasons why our 
first answer might be wrong, before deciding on an answer.
Completely 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 Completely 
disagree
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INTERVENTIONS FOR MYSIDE BIAS AND TEACHING ACTIVELY OPEN-
MINDED THINKING 
 Baron (1988) argued that when people deviate from the normative model of good 
thinking, they do so by showing favoritism towards evidence that would support their 
preferred beliefs and conclusions and ignorance or under-weighing of evidence that 
would contradict these beliefs and conclusions. Perkins, Bushey, and Faraday (1986) calls 
this set of failures in thinking “myside bias.” 
 Baron (2008) argued that people’s tendency to seek evidence and make inferences 
favoring their beliefs is the most serious problem in thinking. He further argued that 
myside bias may lead to irrational belief persistence. Favoring one-side in search for 
evidence might make false beliefs to last longer, and could even strengthen the existing 
false beliefs when they should get weaker.  
Interventions for Myside Bias 
 As we discussed in the previous section, people’s tendency to conduct insufficient 
search for evidence and possibilities and ignore or dismiss new evidence affect people’s 
reasoning negatively. In addition to unsubstantiated strengthening of arguments on one 
side and interpreting evidence in a self-serving way, research has also shown that people 
who do not follow the principles of AOT are also overconfident and less accurate than 
those who are good thinkers (Koriat et al., 1980; Hoch, 1985). 
 If overconfidence and inaccuracy are problems resulting from ignorance of 
alternative evidence or possibilities, then an intervention that would make subjects 
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consider alternatives should decrease, if not eliminate, unwarranted overconfidence, and 
improve accuracy. What makes people consider alternatives? Studies found that making 
the alternatives salient was successful in getting subjects to consider alternatives, 
decreasing unwarranted overconfidence (e.g., Weinstein, 1980), and increasing subjects’ 
accuracy (e.g., Hoch, 1985). Researchers employed different methods such as presenting 
likelihoods of data under both the focal and alternative hypotheses (Weinstein, 1980; 
Trope & Bassok, 1982 and 1983; Bassok & Trope, 1984; Trope & Mackie, 1987), asking 
questions that mention both hypotheses as opposed to just one (Baron, Beattie, & 
Hershey, 1988), asking participants to generate their own hypotheses (Koehler, 1994), 
making subjects generate reasons why an alternative might be true (Koriat et al., 1980; 
Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977), and telling subjects explicitly to consider the alternative 
(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984) to increase the saliency of alternatives. 
Teaching Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 Researchers have argued for teaching good thinking through instruction 
(Nickerson, 1988; Baron, 1993) and it has been shown that AOT can be taught this way. 
Selz (1935) (as cited in Baron et al., 2016) is one of the earliest training research studies 
conducted, where students, aged 11 to 13, were given an intelligence test with various 
types of problems. The training group was given training on only one type of problem, 
where students were instructed to consider the requirements of the task, and test whether 
each solution met each task requirement. These students were also taught to explain why 
certain answers did not meet the requirements and to justify their answers when they 
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seemed to meet the requirements. Compared to the no-training group, the training group 
showed more improvement in their scores on the intelligence test in all problem types. 
Additionally, the training group was more likely to change their answers to correct it in 
the post-training administration of the intelligence test than they were in the pre-training 
administration of the test. As a result of the training, students were more likely to look for 
evidence against their initial answers and change them. 
 Perkins et al. (1986) also designed experimental reasoning courses for high school 
students based on previous research in informal reasoning. These courses were taught 
over four consecutive weeks for a total of 16 lessons. The courses emphasized generating 
reasons by using existing knowledge, and avoiding myside bias. Additionally, students 
were trained to be true, relevant, and complete while reasoning. The classes mostly 
involved students’ critiquing their own and peers’ reasoning performances with these 
reasoning standards in mind. Students’ reasoning about some controversial issues at the 
end of the course was compared to their reasoning on these issues before the course. The 
authors observed that the number of arguments students listed on the other side from their 
own and the quality of these arguments increased as a result of the course. Moreover, 
when the authors examined the effects of law school classes, high school debate classes, a 
first-year college class on critical thinking, and a graduate course on thinking, they 
observed no effect of these courses on students’ tendency to write other side reasons or 
the quality of these reasons, but they did observe an increase in the number of myside 
reasons and their quality as a result of taking these classes. The authors concluded that 
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even though actively open-minded thinking can be taught, the instructions should be 
more specific to teach this way of thinking, and not just require students to think. 
 Similarly, Baron, Badgio, and Gaskins (1985) trained students with reading 
disability for 8-months. These students exhibited certain cognitive styles that prevented 
them from being academically successful. More specifically, these students were 
impulsive, rigid, and non-persistent in their thinking such that they did not spend enough 
time to think about problems, failed to consider alternatives to initial possibilities, and 
were unable to complete longer tasks. Thus, the training focused on changing these 
cognitive styles. Students were taught to take time to think, consider alternatives, and 
keep trying by examples, practice exercises, and feedback. Compared to the control 
group, students in the training condition took more time to think in various laboratory 
tasks, and those students who were particularly impulsive improved their overall 
accuracy in these tasks. Finally, Graumlich and Baron (1991) taught two decision making 
courses to sixth graders and high school students, which included discussion of AOT. The 
authors observed informally that students who used to be very closed-minded before the 
course, became more open-minded and considered multiple options and evaluated these 
options appropriately.  
 The studies listed above tried to train mostly students in high school and younger. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that were conducted with adults. In this 
chapter we discuss results from two training studies, where we trained adult subjects in 
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AOT on the World Wide Web and tested the effects of this training on a probabilistic 
judgment task. 
Overview of the Chapter 
 In this chapter we report results from studies where we either instructed subjects 
to consider alternative reasons or trained subjects in AOT. In studies 4 and 5 we tested 
whether telling subjects to consider alternative reasons would improve subjects’ Brier 
scores and reduce overconfidence. These were replication studies of Koriat et al. (1980) 
and Hoch (1985) with different questions. We hypothesized that subjects’ Brier scores in 
the intervention condition should be lower when compared to the Brier scores in the 
control condition. Additionally, we expected the subjects in the intervention condition to 
have lower overconfidence than those in the control condition. In studies 6 and 7, we 
designed a one-hour online AOT training for adults. We hypothesized that subjects should 
have lower Brier scores and lower overconfidence in the training condition than in the 
no-training condition. We additionally expected that compared to the no-training 
condition, subjects would write more reasons that went against their preferred answers in 
the training condition. 
Study 4 
 The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether forcing subjects to give 
a reason that goes against their preferred choice or a reason that supports a non-preferred 
answer would improve their Brier scores. 
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Method 
 Subjects. Sixty-three subjects participated in the study. The subjects’ age ranged 
from 21 to 71 (Median = 46); 58.7% were female. The make-up of the subjects in this 
study were the same as those in previous studies. Subjects were paid $8 for their 
participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects was notified by email when 
the study was ready, and the study was removed after 72 hours. 
 Questions. Subjects answered 20 questions with three answer options A, B, and C 
in randomized order. The questions were the same as those used in Study 2 with one 
exception. We replaced an arithmetic question with a population question as it would be 
very difficult for subjects to come up with an against reason if they knew the correct 
answer. A full list of questions and answers along with their difficulty and discrimination 
scores can be found in Appendix B-1.  
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args5.html.  
 The procedure for this study was similar to that of Study 2 with the following 
modifications. There were two conditions: (1) a control condition where subjects would 
answer questions like the subjects in Study 2, and list at least two reasons but they were 
not required to give reasons that were against their preferred answer or for a non-
preferred answer; (2) an experimental condition where subjects had to again list at least 
two reasons but this time, one of the reasons had to be either against their preferred 
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answer or for a non-preferred answer (Twoside condition from now on). All subjects did 
the task in both conditions, and answered half the questions in the control condition, and 
the other half in the experimental condition. Half of the subjects did the task where the 
sequence of control and experimental conditions were completely randomized. The other 
half of the subjects did the task where the first five items were in the control condition, 
while for items 6 through 20, they did ten of the questions in the experimental condition, 
and five of them in the control condition. Subjects were assigned to these two different 
sequences randomly. The reason for the different sequences was to test for possible carry-
over effects due to the within-subject design of the study. Subjects in both conditions then 
made probability judgments about the correctness of each option after listing their 
reasons. 
 Another way this study differed from the previous studies was that for reason 
classifications; we added a seventh option labeled “None in particular” for reasons 
subjects might come up with, that are more like thoughts that do not correspond to being 
for or against any of the answer options. 
 After the data collection was completed, the classifications of reasons were 
checked by one of the authors (BG) to ensure that subjects’ reasons were classified 
correctly. 
Summary and Discussion of Results 
 In this study we tested whether simply requiring subjects to list at least one reason 
against their preferred answers would change subjects’ Brier scores and confidence.  
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 We observed small but statistically non-significant correlations between subjects’ 
Brier scores and AOT measures. Additionally, we observed that the relation between 
AOT-Reasons and Brier scores strengthens as the question difficulty increases. As Figure 
1 shows, the correlation between AOT-Reasons and Brier scores is negative for the most 
difficult questions. This effect we observed is quite large, and it seems that listing more 
reasons that go against one’s preferred answers lowers their Brier scores by lowering 
confidence.  
 Linear mixed-effect models we ran to understand the relations between AOT-
Reasons, Brier scores, and subjects’ correctness on questions showed an interaction 
between AOT-Reasons and subjects’ answering questions correctly, as well as an effect of 
AOT-Reasons on subjects’ answering questions correctly such that higher AOT-Reasons 
scores were associated with subjects’ answering questions correctly. Additionally, we 
observed a good effect of AOT-Reasons on Brier scores when subjects answered 
questions correctly, but a bad effect of AOT-Reasons on Brier scores when subjects were 
incorrect. Specifically, when subjects were incorrect, higher scores on AOT-Reasons were 
associated with lower Brier scores, but when subjects were correct, higher AOT-Reasons 
were associated with higher Brier scores. We did not observe any effect of AOT-Beliefs 
on subjects’ Brier scores. 
 Using subjects as the unit of analysis we did not observe any statistically 
significant correlations between either measures of AOT and overconfidence. However, 
AOT-Reasons had an effect on subjects’ overconfidence and their probability judgments 
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for their favored answers in the linear mixed-effect models we ran such that subjects who 
had higher AOT-Reasons scores tended to have lower overconfidence. 
 Comparisons between the control and experimental conditions showed that 
subjects scored higher on AOT-Reasons, and wrote more reasons in the experimental 
condition, but even though the Brier scores and overconfidence were lower in the 
experimental condition, this difference between the two conditions did not reach 
statistical significance. However, we observed lower Brier scores in the Twoside 
condition than in the control condition, when subjects did not know the correct answers 
to the questions. The linear mixed-effect models we ran to discern the effects of our 
experimental manipulation on subjects’ confidence showed an effect of Twoside 
instructions on subjects’ confidence, but this effect disappeared or diminished when other 
variables such as the number of reasons against preferred answers or the number of 
reasons for preferred answers were included in the model. A mediation analysis showed 
that the effect of Twoside on subjects’ confidence is mediated by its effect on the 
aforementioned variables. We next report our results in more detail. 
Results 
Individual Differences Measures for Actively Open Minded Thinking 
 We calculated the individual differences measures as described in Study 2. The 
subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores ranged from -1.626 to 1.364 (M = 0.789, SD = 0.636), while 
their mean AOT-Reasons scores ranged from 0.50 to 1.40 (M = 0.82, SD = 0.188). A 
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correlation between AOT-Beliefs and mean AOT-Reasons scores was not statistically 
significant, r = -0.07, t(61) = -0.55, p = 0.59, two-tailed.  
 Next we ran a correlation between subjects’ mean Brier scores and AOT-Beliefs. 
There was a small and statistically non-significant correlation between these two 
variables in the expected direction, r = -0.12, t(60) = -0.90, p = 0.19, one-tailed. We 
expected a negative correlation between mean AOT-Reasons and mean Brier scores, 
showing that lower Brier scores would be associated with higher AOT-Reasons scores, 
but the correlation we observed between these two variables was small and not 
statistically significant, r = -0.14, t(60)= -1.08, p = 0.14, one-tailed.  
 Finally, we looked at how the correlation between Brier scores and mean AOT-
Reasons behaved as the question difficulty varied. We observed a large correlation in the 
expected direction, r = -0.52, t(18)= -2.62, p = 0.01, two-tailed. Our hypothesis that as the 
questions get more difficult, the correlation between Brier scores and AOT reasoning get 
stronger, was supported. 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. Next we ran linear mixed-effect models to assess 
the effect of actively open-minded measures on subjects’ Brier scores. We first regressed 
the Brier scores of subjects on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random 
effects. We did not observe a statistically significant effect of the measure on subjects’ 
Brier scores (-0.035, 95% c.i. -0.086 to 0.016, Wald method).   
 We additionally regressed the Brier scores of subjects over AOT-Reasons and 
Correct (whether subjects guessed the answer correctly where 1 = correct and 0 = 
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incorrect with subjects and items as crossed random effects). AOT-Reasons had an effect 
on subjects’ Brier scores (-0.063, 95% c.i. -0.098 to -0.029, Wald method), and as it 
would be expected Correct did have an effect on the Brier scores (-0.486, 95% c.i. -0.521 
to -0.452, Wald method). We also observed an interaction effect of AOT-Reasons and 
Correct on the Brier scores (0.110, 95% c.i. 0.076 to 0.144, Wald method).  
 Next we split our data into two based on whether subjects guessed a specific 
question correctly or incorrectly. For each dataset, we regressed subjects’ Brier scores on 
AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random effects. The results showed a 
good effect when subjects guessed the question incorrectly such that higher AOT-Reasons 
scores were associated with lower Brier scores (-0.130, 95% c.i. -0.200 to -0.059, Wald 
method).  However, when subjects answered the question correctly, we observed a bad 16
effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier scores such that higher AOT-Reasons scores 
were associated with higher Brier scores (0.066, 95% c.i. 0.030 to 0.102, Wald method).  17
Finally, we ran a generalized linear mixed-effect model to determine any effect of AOT-
Reasons on Correct but we did not observe any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct 
(-0.111, 95% c.i. -0.391 to 0.169, Wald method). These results are similar to the results 
we observed in previous studies; answering a question correctly is independent of having 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 16
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct<0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for incorrectly answered questions.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 17
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct>0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for correctly answered questions.
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high or low AOT-Reasons scores, and they shed some light onto the stronger relation 
between Brier scores and AOT-Reasons when questions are more difficult. 
 An additional linear mixed-effect model analysis did not show a statistically 
significant effect of AOT-Beliefs on subjects’ Brier scores either (-0.031, 95% c.i. -0.099 
to 0.037, Wald method). 
Overconfidence and Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 We used two overconfidence measures in assessing the relations between AOT 
and overconfidence. The first measure, Over1, compared subjects’ probability judgments 
for their preferred answers to the percentage of correct answers. The second measure, 
Over2, compared subjects’ expected Brier scores (EBS, see the results section of Studies 
1A and 1B for an explanation of this measure) to their actual Brier scores. For both 
measures, the mean overconfidence scores were positive, meaning that subjects were 
overconfident in their probability judgments (MOver1 = 0.09; MOver2 = 0.35). 
 We hypothesized that subjects who had higher AOT-Reasons scores would have 
lower overconfidence. We observed no statistically significant correlations between AOT-
Reasons and each overconfidence measure. The correlation coefficient between AOT-
Reasons and Over1 as the overconfidence measure was -0.02, t(60) = -0.16, p = 0.44, 
one-tailed. The correlation between Over2 and AOT-Reasons was small and not 
statistically significant, r = -0.18, t(60) = -1.41, p = 0.08, one-tailed. Similarly, a 
correlation between either overconfidence measure and AOT-Beliefs scores was not 
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statistically significant either (with Over1 as the overconfidence measure, r = -0.18, t(60) 
= -1.44, p = 0.08, one-tailed; with Over2, r = -0.12, t(60) = -0.94, p = 0.17, one-tailed). 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We regressed the new overconfidence measure 
(Over2) on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random effects. Our analysis 
showed a significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Over2 (-0.073, 95% c.i. -0.121 to -0.027, 
Wald method). Subjects who wrote more reasons that went against their preferred 
answers were less overconfident about their answers. However, we did not observe a 
statistically significant effect of AOT-Beliefs on Over2 (-0.039, 95% c.i. -0.118 to 0.041) 
even though the sign of the regression coefficient was in the expected direction.  
 We also regressed subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred answer (Prob 
from now on) on AOT-Reasons with items and subjects as crossed random effects.  We 18
observed a statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Prob such that higher AOT-
Reasons scores were associated with lower probability judgments (-0.067, 95% c.i. 
-0.091 to -0.042, Wald method). A linear mixed-effect model regressing Prob on AOT-
Reasons and Correct with items and subjects as crossed random effects showed an effect 
of AOT-Reasons (-0.065, 95% c.i. -0.090 to -0.040, Wald method) and an effect of 
Correct on Prob (0.024, 95% c.i. 0.014 to 0.034, Wald method).   As also observed in 19
Study 2, scoring high on AOT-Reasons was associated with lower probability judgments 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|S),d1), where Ar is AOT-18
Reasons, C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
 The lmer function in R for this model was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Correct + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|19
S),d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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for preferred answers, and answering questions correctly was associated with higher 
probability judgments for preferred answers.  
Effect of Twoside Instructions on Subjects’ Reasons 
 We first wanted to check whether our subjects followed the instructions and wrote 
at least one argument that was against their preferred answer when they were asked to do 
so. Based on the previous studies, we knew that most subjects do not list reasons that go 
against their preferred answers, so we thought that running a two sample t-test to see 
whether their AOT-Reasons score were higher in Two-sided condition were higher than 
their AOT-Reasons score in the control condition would be an appropriate way of doing 
this. We calculated average AOT-Reasons scores for subjects in the control and Two-
sided conditions, and ran a one-tailed two sample t-test. We expected the mean AOT-
Reasons scores in the Two-sided condition to be higher than those in the control 
condition if subjects followed the instructions in the study. This turned out to be the case, 
t = 12.93, p < 0.001, N = 126, one-tailed (MControl = 0.53, MTwoside = 1.10). 
 We additionally looked at whether instructing subjects to list at least one reason 
that went against their preferred answer would affect the number of reasons they list. In 
this study, subjects were told to give at least two reasons for each question, and 
sometimes they were required to list one reason that was against their answer. Therefore, 
there was nothing in the instructions that specifically asked subjects to list more than two 
reasons in any case. A question we had was whether prompting a change in the kind of 
reasons they write would also lead them to make a more thorough search for evidence 
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about their answer, and thus writing more reasons overall. We compared the average 
number of reasons written by each subject in both conditions. The result of a two sample 
t-test showed that our hypothesis was supported, t = 2.01, p = 0.02, N = 126, one-tailed 
(MControl = 2.38, MTwoside = 2.60). We are not sure exactly how the Two-sided condition 
increases the number of reasons submitted. One reason might be that because people 
were forced to think against their answer, they had to first go through the reasons that 
supported their answer until they could come up with a reason that met the expectations. 
Another way the instructions might have led to this increase in number of reasons would 
be that the challenge of having to come up with a reason that went against their preferred 
answer made the subjects more likely to search for additional evidence. 
Effect of Twoside Instructions on Brier Scores 
 Next we wanted to see whether instructing people to write reasons that went 
against their answers would lower their Brier scores. To test this hypothesis, we 
calculated the mean average Brier scores for each condition and ran a two sample t-test. 
The mean Brier score for the Two-sided condition was lower but not significantly so, t = 
-1.01, p = 0.16, N = 124, one-tailed (MControl = 0.66, MTwoside = 0.63).  
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We regressed subjects’ Brier scores on Twoside 
with subjects and items as crossed effects, and observed that Twoside instructions were 
associated with lower Brier scores, but this effect was not statistically significant (-0.031, 
95% c.i. -0.085 to 0.023, Wald method). Regressing Brier scores on Correct and Twoside 
also showed an effect of Correct (-0.422, 95% c. i. -0.451 to -0.395, Wald method), 
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Twoside (-0.042, 95% c. i. -0.080 to -0.005, Wald method), as well as an interaction 
effect of Correct and Twoside on Brier scores (0.057, 95% c. i. 0.019 to 0.095, Wald 
method). Lower Brier scores were associated with Twoside instructions and correct 
answers. The interaction effect showed that the effect of Twoside on Brier scores varies 
with whether subjects knew the correct answer or not. To investigate further, we divided 
our data into two so that we could test the effect of Twoside instructions on Brier scores 
when subjects were correct and incorrect. When subjects were incorrect, Twoside had a 
big effect on Brier scores (-0.083, 95% c. i. -0.139 to -0.028, Wald method). When 
subjects were correct, Twoside again had an effect on Brier scores, but this effect was 
smaller, not statistically significant and in the opposite direction (0.027, 95% c. i. -0.002 
to 0.055, Wald method). It seems that Twoside instructions are most beneficial when 
subjects do not know the correct answers, and it might be even hurtful if subjects know 
the correct answers.  
Effect of Twoside Instructions on Overconfidence 
 Finally, we looked at whether the manipulation made subjects less overconfident. 
We first compared Over1 scores for each subject between the two conditions. Even 
though Over1 scores were lower in the Twoside condition than those in the control 
condition, this difference between the conditions was not statistically significant, t = 
-0.83, p = 0.20, N = 124, one-tailed (MControl = 0.11, MTwoside = 0.08). We next compared 
the mean Over2 scores for each subject between the two conditions. A two-sample t-test 
showed that the overconfidence was slightly lower in the Twoside condition, but this 
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result was again not statistically significant, t = -1.41, p = 0.08, N = 124, one-tailed 
(MControl = 0.38, MTwoside = 0.32). 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We ran additional regression models to understand 
the relationship between the Twoside instructions and subjects’ confidence. First, we 
regressed Prob (subject’s probability judgment for their preferred option) on Twoside 
(whether the question was answered in the experimental (=1) or control (=0) conditions), 
and observed a statistically significant effect of Twoside on Prob such that subjects 
assigned lower probabilities to their preferred options if they answered the question in 
Twoside condition (-0.039, 95% c.i. -0.060 to -0.018, Wald method).   20
 Next, we regressed Prob on Ar (the number of reasons against the subject’s 
preferred option), Arb (the number of reasons for the subject’s preferred option), Correct 
(whether the subject answered the question correctly (=1) or not (=0)), and Twoside with 
items and subjects as crossed random effects.  We observed significant effects of Ar 21
(-0.048, 95% c.i. -0.76 to -0.020, Wald method), Arb (0.035, 95% c.i. 0.015 to 0.055, 
Wald method), and Correct (0.022, 95% c.i. 0.007 to 0.037, Wald method) but no 
significant effect of Twoside on Prob (-0.000, 95% c.i. -0.025 to 0.024, Wald method). 
Higher number of reasons for subjects’ preferred options and answering the questions 
correctly were associated with higher confidence, while higher number of reasons against 
subject’s preferred options was associated with lower confidence. The Twoside 
  The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Twoside + (1+Twoside|C) + (1+Twoside|S),d1), 20
where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Correct + Arb + Twoside + (1|C) + (0+Ar + 21
Correct + Arb|C) + (1|S) + (0 + Ar + Correct + Arb|S), d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 
is the data frame.
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manipulation did not have an effect on subjects’ probability judgment for their preferred 
answer when additional variables were added to the model. 
 Additionally, we observed that Twoside did not interact with anything or did not 
have any effect on Prob on itself as long as Ar and Arb are included in the model. Higher 
number of reasons for subjects’ preferred options were associated with higher confidence, 
while higher number of reasons against subjects’ preferred options were associated with 
lower confidence. We regressed Prob on Ar, Arb, Twoside, the interaction between 
Twoside and Ar, and the interaction between Twoside and Arb with items and subjects as 
crossed random effects.  Once again we observed significant effects of Ar (-0.052, 95% 22
c.i. -0.088 to -0.017, Wald method) and Arb (0.042, 95% c.i. 0.017 to 0.067, Wald 
method), but no significant effect of Twoside on Prob (-0.012, 95% c.i. -0.098 to 0.074, 
Wald method). There was also no interaction of Twoside with Ar (0.026, 95% c.i. -0.037 
to 0.089, Wald method) or with Arb (-0.010, 95% c.i. -0.036 to 0.017, Wald method). 
While Twoside instructions affect the number of against reasons people write for their 
preferred answer, it does not seem to change any of the relationships that also exist. 
 Mediation Analysis. While we observed an effect of Twoside on Prob when 
Twoside is the only independent variable in the linear-mixed effect model, this effect 
disappeared when we added other independent variables to the model. A possible 
explanation is that the effect of Twoside is mediated by its effect on Ar and Arb variables. 
Therefore, we decided to run a simple mediation model as recommended by Baron and 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ (Ar + Arb) * Twoside + (1|C) + (0 + Ar + Arb|C) 22
+ (0 + Ar * Twoside|C) + (0 + Arb * Twoside|C) + (1|S) + (0 + Ar + Arb|S) + (0 + Ar * Twoside|
S) + (0 + Arb*Twoside|S), d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame.
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Kenny (1986). We already established above that Twoside has a statistically significant 
effect on Prob. Next, we regressed Ar on Twoside.  We observed an effect of Twoside on 23
Ar such that when subjects answered the questions in Twoside condition, they wrote 
more reasons that were against their preferred answers (0.574, 95% c.i. 0.482 to 0.665, 
Wald method). We also regressed Arb on Twoside , and observed a significant effect of 24
Twoside on Arb such that when subjects answered the questions in Twoside condition, 
they wrote fewer reasons that were for their preferred answers (-0.257, 95% c.i. -0.370 to 
-0.143, Wald method). Finally, we regressed Prob on Ar and Twoside , and observed a 25
statistically significant effect of Ar on Prob (-0.069, 95% c.i. -0.101 to -0.037, Wald 
method), but no effect of Twoside on Prob (0.003, 95% c.i. -0.027 to 0.032, Wald 
method). When we regressed Prob on Arb and Twoside , we observed a statistically 26
significant effect of Arb on Prob (0.048, 95% c.i. 0.028 to 0.068, Wald method) and a 
statistically significant effect of Twoside on Prob (-0.026, 95% c.i. -0.046 to -0.005, Wald 
method). Twoside’s effect on Prob disappeared when Ar was included in the model, and 
the beta coefficient for Twoside has become smaller when Arb was included in the model 
even though it still had a significant effect on Prob. Thus, it seems that Ar and Arb 
mediate the effect of Twoside on Prob. 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Ar ~ Twoside + (1 + Twoside|C) + (1 + Twoside|S), d1), 23
where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Arb ~ Twoside + (1 + Twoside|C) + (1 + Twoside|S), 24
d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Twoside + (1 + Ar + Twoside|C) + (1 + Ar + 25
Twoside|S), d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Arb + Twoside + (1 + Arb + Twoside|C) + (1 + 26
Arb + Twoside|S), d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame.
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 Carryover Effects. Given the design of our study, it is possible that there might 
have been some carryover effects as subjects switched between control and training 
conditions throughout the task. To test for any potential carryover effects, we regressed 
Ar0 (the number of against reasons subjects wrote in control condition) and Ar1 (the 
number of against reasons subjects wrote in Twoside condition) on the position of each 
item in the presentation order (Item), and the number of Twoside items through the 
current item (Twoside.cumsum) with subjects as crossed random effects. We did not 
observe any carryover effects in either regressions.  There was no effect of Item (0.009, 
95% c.i. -0.023 to 0.041, Wald method) or Twoside.cumsum (-0.011, 95% c.i. -0.071 to 
0.049, Wald method) on Ar0. Similarly, there was no effect of Item (0.008, 95% c.i. 
-0.010 to 0.026, Wald method) or Twoside.cumsum (-0.013, 95% c.i. -0.048 to 0.022, 
Wald method) on Ar1. 
Study 5 
 The aim of this study was to investigate whether forcing subjects to write reasons 
that considered why their estimates might be too high or too low would make their 
estimates more accurate. This study was similar to Study 4 with the exception that we 
used numerical judgment questions rather than multiple choice questions. 
Method 
 Subjects. Seventy-six subjects participated in the study. The subjects’ age ranged 
from 21 to 71 (Median = 46); 57.6% were female. The make-up of the subjects in this 
study were the same as those in previous studies. Subjects were paid $9 for their 
!63
participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects was notified by email when 
the study was ready, and the study was removed when we had about 75 subjects. 
 Questions. Subjects answered 20 questions in an order randomized for each 
subject. The questions came from the pool of questions used in Pilot Study 3, and were 
picked as described in the results section of that study. A full list of questions and answers 
along with their difficulty and discrimination scores can be found in Appendix B-1.  
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args8.html.  
 The procedure for this study was similar to that of Study 4 with the exception that 
we used numerical questions rather than a probability task. There were two conditions: 
(1) a control condition where subjects would answer questions and list arguments as in 
Study 4, and list at least two reasons but they were not required to give reasons why the 
correct answer could be outside or inside of their interval; (2) an experimental condition 
where subjects had to again list two reasons but this time, one of the reasons had to be 
about why the correct answer could be outside their interval, and one reason why the 
correct answer could be inside their interval. All subjects did the task in both conditions, 
and answered half the questions in the control condition, and the other half in the 
experimental condition. Half of the subjects did the task where the sequence of control 
and experimental conditions were completely randomized. The other half of the subjects 
did the task where the first five items were in the control condition, while for items 6 
!64
through 20, they did ten of the questions were in the experimental condition, and five of 
them in the control condition. Subjects were assigned to these two different sequences 
randomly. The reason for the different sequences was to test for possible carry-over 
effects due to the within-subject design of the study. 
 Upon answering all the questions, the subjects were again presented with the AOT 
scale (see Table 2). After the data collection was completed, the classifications of reasons 
were checked by one of the authors (BG) to ensure that subjects’ reasons were classified 
correctly. 
Results and Discussion  
 This study tried to force people to write more reasons against why their estimates 
could be inaccurate. After looking at the data, we saw that the study did not work. The 
flaw of the experimental design was that subjects’ AOT-Reasons scores were pretty high 
even without the experimental manipulation, which asked people to think of one reason 
why the correct estimate could be within their given confidence interval, and one reason 
why the correct estimate would be outside of their given confidence interval. Many of the 
subjects’ reasons were about why their interval was too small before the manipulation. 
Exposing them to the experimental manipulation made them give reasons why their 
interval was not too small. Thus, the instructions increased the number of reasons given 
by subjects, but there was no increase in subjects’ AOT-Reasons scores. This also made 
AOT-Reasons not correlate with any of the other variables. 
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Study 6 
 The aim of this study was to see whether a training module could teach subjects to 
be more actively open-minded thinkers, and make them more accurate on a probability 
task. 
Method 
 Subjects. One hundred and sixty-eight subjects participated in the study. The 
subjects’ age ranged from 20 to 79 (Median = 50); 71.4% were female. The make-up of 
the subjects in this study were the same as those in previous ones. Subjects were paid $16 
for their participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 400 subjects were notified by 
email when the study was ready, and the study was removed after 4 days have passed. 
 Training. The training module consisted of three parts: (1) Introduction to the 
concept of actively open-minded thinking and relevant vocabulary; (2) Introduction to the 
concept of myside bias and ways of avoiding this bias; (3) An exercise to help subjects 
test their thinking before attempting the upcoming task. The full training can be found in 
Appendix D-1.  
 In the first part of the training subjects saw short paragraphs explaining what good 
thinking is, and were taught relevant vocabulary such as “possibility”, “evidence”, and 
“conclusion” within the context of judgments. After the textbook introduction subjects 
did an exercise that asked them to categorize a hypothetical person’s thought process. 
Subjects had to decide whether the person was stating a possibility or evidence, drawing 
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a conclusion, or searching for possibility or evidence. After completing this exercise, they 
were shown their selected responses and given feedback.  
 In the second part of the training subjects read short paragraphs and examples, 
and learned about myside bias and ways people commit this bias. 
 In the third part of the training subjects had the opportunity to test their own 
thinking by answering at least 3 of the 6 three-choice choice questions presented to them. 
The questions in this section included a variety of topics such as country population and 
movie release dates. For each question subjects chose to answer, they had to first write 
down their thought process, then pick an answer, and finally give probability judgments 
for each option. After seeing the first three questions, subjects were presented with a 
reminder page where we modeled to them how someone who was using the principles of 
AOT and someone who was committing myside bias could think about the first question. 
After this reminder subjects continued with the third part of the training. At the end of the 
exercise questions, subjects were shown the reasons they listed, their preferred answer, 
and the correct answer, and were asked to self-evaluate their responses to see how 
successful they were applying the principles of actively open-minded thinking. Upon 
completion of this part, subjects were given a seven-item survey asking them about their 
experience of learning about AOT, and the subjects agreed or disagreed on a 5-point scale 
(1= Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). After 
completing the short survey subjects were given the chance to submit any additional 
comments, and were forwarded to the next part of the study. 
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 Questions. The questions were the same as those used in Study 2. A full list of 
questions and answers along with their difficulty and discrimination scores can be found 
in Appendix B-1.  
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args9.html.  
 Subjects were randomly assigned either to a training condition or to a control 
condition (Ncontrol = Ntraining = 84). Subjects who were in the training condition first 
completed the training described above, and moved onto the second part of the study, 
where they answered 20 questions. Those who were in the control condition did the third 
part of the training without self-evaluation (see Appendix E), and had to answer at least 4 
questions. After completing this part, these subjects also moved onto the second part of 
the study where the same 20 questions. Subjects in both conditions were given 36 hours 
to complete both parts of the study.  
 In the second part of the study subjects answered one question on each page. 
Below the short information the subjects saw the question with three options, and 
underneath that they were given six note spaces to list their reasons for and against their 
preferred answer. They were not required to use all six text input spaces but they had to 
write at least two reasons. Subjects picked a preferred answer after they listed their 
reasons. They were also given choices for probabilities to indicate their confidence in any 
answer option being correct, and were instructed to choose the one that was closest to 
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what they think. The options for probability judgments were 0, 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60, 70, 90, 95, 99, and 100 (in percent). Subjects knew that 100% would mean they were 
completely certain that an answer was correct, but they would have a probability of 33% 
being correct if they were guessing. They were also informed on the instruction page that 
their probability judgments for the three answers would need to add up to about 100% 
(no less than 90% and not greater than 110% to allow for the limited set of options). After 
completing the page, they could move onto the the next page by clicking a button where 
they could classify their reasons as being for or against the choice options. Once they 
completed the classification task, they moved onto the next page, again by clicking a 
button, where they were presented with a new question and they repeated the same 
procedure for the remaining questions.  
 After answering all questions, the subjects were presented with an AOT scale (see 
Table 2). They read 11 statements regarding beliefs about thinking, and were asked to 
indicate their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale (1 = completely agree, 5 
= completely disagree). Once the subjects completed the survey, they clicked a button to 
submit their responses. As in the previous studies, after the data collection was 
completed, the classifications of reasons were checked by one of the authors (BG) to 
ensure that subjects’ reasons were classified correctly. 
Summary and Discussion of Results 
 This study attempted to teach people principles of AOT and how to reduce myside 
bias. Our training module was partially successful. We found some evidence showing that 
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going through the training module made subjects write more reasons, and also more 
reasons that went against their preferred answers. Even though subjects in the training 
condition had lower overconfidence and lower Brier scores, these differences were not 
statistically different from those of the subjects’ in the control condition. Linear mixed-
effect models showed an effect of AOT on overconfidence such that subjects who score 
high on the AOT measures had lower overconfidence.  
 A criticism of this study concerns the training module. Even though the module 
explained the advantages of using alternative reasons to subjects, there was neither much 
incentive for subjects to push themselves to list alternative reasons nor enough 
opportunities to practice the newly learned thinking skills during the training exercises. 
Due to these reasons we decided to modify our training module and replicate the study. 
 Additionally, AOT-Reasons was not as useful as a measure in this study as it had 
been previously. One reason might be a slight change we did to the way subjects 
submitted their responses and reasons. Previous studies asked subjects to indicate their 
preferred answer first, and then list their reasons before they were given a chance to 
revise their answer. In this study we asked subjects to read the question, list reasons for or 
against any answer options, and then ask them to pick an answer. This might have led 
people to behave differently and make them follow their reasons to pick an answer, which 
would decrease their AOT-Reasons scores.  
 However, the lack of any significant AOT-Reasons effects on Brier scores is not a 
new observation, as we have seen similar results in previous studies as well. Therefore, 
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we conducted additional analyses to discern the underlying mechanism for these results 
as we did in previous studies, and got comparable results. Once again further analyses 
showed that the effect of this measure on the Brier scores is dependent on whether 
subjects were correct or not, such that when subjects answered the questions incorrectly, 
scoring higher on AOT measure from reasons was associated with lower Brier scores, 
while in the cases where subjects answered the questions correctly, scoring higher on 
AOT measure from reasons was associated with higher Brier scores. Additionally, 
subjects’ answering a question correctly was independent of what their AOT-Reasons 
scores were. These analyses explain the correlation we have observed over multiple 
studies where the correlation between Brier scores and the AOT from measure scores got 
stronger as the question difficulty increased. In the section below we describe our results 
in further detail. 
Results 
 We omitted six subjects from data analysis due to various reasons. One subject 
did not complete the first part of the studies. Three subjects went through the training 
module too fast, and two subjects gave inadequate reasons. We also excluded seven 
additional subjects from the AOT-Reasons calculations and any tests run involving this 
measure, because these subjects wrote the answer they picked rather than providing 
reasons for their choices. 
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Individual Differences Measures for Actively Open Minded Thinking  
 We calculated the individual differences measures as described in Studies 1A and 
1B. The subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores ranged from -1.182 to 1.909 (M = 0.711, SD = 
0.602), while their mean AOT-Reasons scores ranged from 0.00 to 1.89 (M = 0.41, SD = 
0.345). A correlation between AOT-Beliefs and mean AOT-Reasons scores was not 
statistically significant, r = 0.05, t(158) = 0.61, p = 0.54, two-tailed. 
 We observed a moderate correlation between subjects’ mean Brier scores and 
AOT-Beliefs, r = -0.30, t(164) = -4.08, p < 0.001, one-tailed. Subjects who scored higher 
on the AOT scale had lower Brier scores. We expected that scoring higher on AOT-
Reasons would be correlated with lower Brier scores, but this hypothesis was not 
supported, r = 0.02, t(156)= 0.48, p = 0.60, one-tailed. Finally, we looked at how the 
correlation between Brier scores and mean AOT-Reasons scores behaved as the question 
difficulty varied. In the earlier studies, we observed that the relation between Brier scores 
and the mean AOT-Reasons scores strengthens as the question difficulty increases. 
However, we did not observe this relation in the current study, r = -0.06, t(17) = -0.26, p 
= 0.79, two-tailed. 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We ran linear mixed-effect models to look at the 
effects of AOT measures on subjects’ Brier scores. We used subjects and items as crossed 
random effects. While we observed an effect of AOT-Beliefs on Brier scores (-0.110, 
95% c.i. -0.163 to -0.057, Wald method), we did not observe this effect when we 
regressed Brier scores on AOT-Reasons (-0.000, 95% c.i. -0.027 to 0.027, Wald method).  
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 One possible reason why AOT-Reasons did not have any effects on subjects’ Brier 
scores could be that the usefulness of considering alternative reasons might be whether a 
subject can guess the answer correctly. If a subject knows the correct answer, they might 
not feel the need to list alternative reasons. We had found some support for this 
hypothesis in previous studies, so we wanted to test it in this study as well given the 
similarity of other results regarding the effects of AOT on Brier scores. We regressed the 
Brier scores of subjects over AOT-Reasons and Correct (whether subjects guessed the 
answer correctly where 1 = correct and 0 = incorrect with subjects and items as crossed 
random effects). AOT-Reasons on its own had no effect on subjects’ Brier scores (-0.008, 
95% c.i. -0.026 to 0.011, Wald method), and as it would be expected Correct did have an 
effect on the Brier scores (-0.385, 95% c.i. -0.399 to -0.371, Wald method). We also 
observed an interaction effect of AOT-Reasons and Correct on the Brier scores (0.059, 
95% c.i. 0.041 to 0.092, Wald method).  
 Next we split our data into two based on whether subjects guessed a specific 
question correctly or incorrectly as we did in previous studies. For each dataset, we 
regressed subjects’ Brier scores on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed 
random effects. The results showed a good effect when subjects guessed the question 
incorrectly such that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower Brier scores 
(-0.092, 95% c.i. -0.130 to -0.053, Wald method).  However, when subjects answered the 27
question correctly, we observed a bad effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier scores 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 27
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct<0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for incorrectly answered questions.
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such that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with higher Brier scores (0.057, 
95% c.i. 0.040 to 0.075, Wald method).  Finally, we ran a generalized linear mixed-28
effect model to determine any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct but we did not observe 
any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct (-0.122, 95% c.i. -0.270 to 0.026, Wald method). It 
seems that subjects’ being correct on a given question is not dependent upon subjects’ 
AOT-Reasons scores. These analyses explain the strengthening of the correlation between 
Brier scores and AOT-Reasons scores as the difficulty of questions increases. Since 
subjects are more likely to answer difficult questions wrong, writing more alternative 
reasons as to why their preferred option might be wrong lowers their Brier scores. 
Overconfidence and Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 We again used two overconfidence measures in assessing the relations between 
AOT and overconfidence. The first measure, Over1, compared subjects’ probability 
judgments for their preferred answers to the percentage of correct answers. The second 
measure, Over2, compared subjects’ expected Brier scores (EBS, see the results section 
of Studies 1A and 1B for an explanation of this measure) to their actual Brier scores. For 
both measures, the mean overconfidence scores were positive, meaning that subjects 
were overconfident in their probability judgments (MOver1 = 0.10; MOver2 = 0.18). 
 We expected lower overconfidence to be associated with higher scores on AOT-
Reasons, but we did not observe a correlation between AOT-Reasons and either 
overconfidence measure (with Over1 as the overconfidence measure: r = -0.01, t(156) = 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 28
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct>0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for correctly answered questions.
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-0.12, p = 0.45, one-tailed; with Over2 as the overconfidence measure: r = -0.05, t(156) = 
-0.60, p = 0.28, one-tailed). However, we did observe a negative correlation between each 
overconfidence measure and AOT-Beliefs scores, showing that higher scores on AOT-
Beliefs was associated with lower overconfidence (with Over1 as the overconfidence 
measure: r = -0.18, t(164) = -2.40, p = 0.01, one-tailed; with Over2 as the overconfidence 
measure: r = -0.20, t(164) = -2.55, p = 0.01, one-tailed). 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We looked at the effects of AOT on 
overconfidence. Both measures of AOT showed an effect on overconfidence such that 
higher scores on these measures were associated with lower overconfidence. We 
regressed the variable Over2 (the difference between mean actual Brier scores and  mean 
expected Brier scores) on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random 
effects. Our analysis showed a significant effect of AOT-Reasons on the overconfidence 
measure (-0.045, 95% c.i. -0.074 to -0.016, Wald method), meaning that subjects who 
wrote more reasons that went against their preferred answers were less overconfident 
about their answers. Similarly, regressing Over2 on AOT-Beliefs with subjects and items 
as crossed random effects also showed a significant effect of AOT-Beliefs on the 
overconfidence measure (-0.089, 95% c.i. -0.168 to -0.021, Wald method). Subjects who 
scored higher on the AOT scale showed lower overconfidence in their answers. 
 We also regressed subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred answer (Prob 
from now on) on AOT-Reasons with items and subjects as crossed random effects.  We 29
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|S),d1), where Ar is AOT-29
Reasons, C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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observed a statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Prob such that higher AOT-
Reasons scores were associated with lower probability judgments (-0.054, 95% c.i. 
-0.068 to -0.040, Wald method). A linear mixed-effect model regressing Prob on AOT-
Reasons and Correct with items and subjects as crossed random effects showed an effect 
of AOT-Reasons (-0.053, 95% c.i. -0.067 to -0.040, Wald method) and an effect of 
Correct on Prob (0.019, 95% c.i. 0.013 to 0.025, Wald method).   Scoring high on AOT-30
Reasons was associated with lower probability judgments for preferred answers, and 
answering questions correctly was associated with higher probability judgments for 
preferred answers. These results are similar to those we observed in previous studies. 
Correlations Between Accuracy Scores, Number of Reasons, and Actively Open-
Minded Thinking 
 We also looked at the relation between subjects’ mean number of reasons they 
wrote (Nreas.s from now on) and their Brier scores. We hypothesized that higher number 
of reasons written would be correlated with lower Brier scores. We observed a small but 
statistically significant correlation between these two variables, r = -0.16, t(164) = -2.04, 
p = 0.02, one-tailed. We also observed a small but statistically significant correlation 
between Nreas.s and AOT-Beliefs, r = 0.13, t(166) = 1.74, p = 0.04, one-tailed. Scoring 
high on the AOT scale was weakly associated with writing more reasons while answering 
the questions in the study. 
 The lmer function in R for this model was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Correct + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|30
S),d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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Comparisons Between the Control and Training Conditions 
 We finally investigated whether the AOT training had any effects on subjects’ 
Brier scores, overconfidence, the number of reasons subjects listed, AOT-Reasons, and 
AOT-Beliefs. We expected the subjects in the training condition to have lower Brier 
scores but did not observe any differences in Brier scores between the conditions, t = 
-0.44, p = 0.33, N = 166, one-tailed (MControl = 0.66, MTraining = 0.65). We also expected 
the subjects in the training condition to have lower overconfidence, but this hypothesis 
was not supported either (using Over1 as the overconfidence measure: t = -0.002, p = 
0.50, N = 166, one-tailed (MControl = 0.097, MTraining = 0.097); using Over2 as the 
overconfidence measure: t = -0.07, p = 0.47, N = 166, one-tailed (MControl = 0.181, 
MTraining = 0.178)). Since the training module emphasized searching for evidence before 
making decisions, we expected that subjects in this condition would end up writing more 
reasons for each answer option than subjects in the control condition. Our hypothesis was 
supported, t = 3.11, p = 0.001, N = 168, one-tailed (MControl = 2.31, MTraining = 2.68). We 
hypothesized that subjects in the training condition would also list more reasons that were 
against their preferred options, and we found support for this hypothesis as well, t = 1.89, 
p = 0.03, N = 160, one-tailed (MControl = 0.36, MTraining = 0.45). Finally, we wanted to see 
whether going through the training would increase subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores, but this 
hypothesis was not supported, t = -0.37, p = 0.36, N = 168, one-tailed (MControl = 0.73, 
MTraining = 0.69). 
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Study 7 
 The aim of this study was to see whether a training module could teach subjects to 
be more actively open-minded thinkers, and make them more accurate on a multiple-
choice trivia task. Based on the results from the previous study, we changed the training 
so that it included questions that would encourage the subjects to list arguments that went 
against their pet beliefs. This study had a within-subject design, and therefore, it included 
a pre-test. 
Method 
 Subjects. One hundred and thirty-one subjects participated in the study. The 
subjects’ age ranged from 18 to 76 (Median = 45); 66.4% were female. The subjects were 
from a panel of about 1200 people who volunteered to do studies for pay on the Internet 
over the last 15 years, through advertising, links from various web sites, and word of 
mouth. They were mostly Americans, varying considerably in age, income, and education 
level, but with women over-represented. Subjects who did not take previous studies 
seriously had been removed over the years. The panel was divided into three groups in 
order to use different samples for closely related studies. Subjects were paid $15 if they 
were in the control condition and $25 if they were in the training condition for their 
participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 400 subjects were notified by email 
when the study was ready, and the study was removed after 5 days have passed. None of 
the subjects who did the previous study participated in this one. 
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 Training. The training module had four parts: (1) Introduction to the training; (2) 
Introduction to the concept of actively open-minded thinking and relevant vocabulary; (3) 
Introduction to the concept of myside bias and how to avoid it; (4) An exercise which 
gave subjects the opportunity to apply what they have learned during their training. The 
full training can be found in Appendix D-2. 
 In the first part of the training subjects were informed about the nature of the 
training, and were presented with two questions to answer. The first question was a 
percentage question where subjects were asked to make a point estimate by assigning a 
value between 0 and 100. The second question was a multiple choice question where they 
had to choose one option. Additionally, for the second question subjects were also asked 
to make probability judgments for each option’s correctness. For both questions subjects 
were asked to tell the experimenters how they came up with their answers, and they were 
allowed to as many reasons as they could. Upon completing these steps they were given a 
chance to change their responses and probability judgments. 
 In the second part of the training subjects read about what thinking is, and learned 
relevant vocabulary such as “possibilities,” “evidence,” “goals,” and “conclusion.” They 
also read short paragraphs about what actively open-minded thinking is, why AOT is 
good thinking, and how it is useful.  
 In the third part of the training subjects first learned about myside bias and how 
this bias operates. Then they read the responses of of two hypothetical respondents who 
modeled either myside bias or AOT for the two questions subjects answered at the 
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beginning of the training. Subjects were explicitly told why and how each respondent was 
displaying myside bias or actively open-minded thinking. After looking at these modeled 
responses, subjects got to see their own responses to these two questions and the correct 
answers. They were also asked to self-evaluate their responses in terms of how much 
myside bias or principles of AOT they displayed. After completing this exercise, subjects 
took a three-item review test to evaluate how well they understood the concepts of good 
and bad thinking. Upon answering all three questions, subjects were given feedback 
regarding their answers to reiterate their learning. 
 In the fourth and final part of the training, subjects were given six problems to 
think about. The first three problems were policy problems and subjects had to pick two 
of these problems to write solutions for. The last three problems were multiple choice 
questions that were similar to the ones in pre- and post-training surveys, and subjects had 
to answer all three. For the policy questions subjects had to list at least three solutions 
(but could list up to 5) to the problem presented and then pick their favorite solution. 
Afterwards, they were required to list at least two and up to a maximum of eight 
arguments. Upon listing their arguments, subjects proceeded onto the next step where 
they had to classify their arguments as “for” or “against” their favored solution or neither. 
After the classification task, subjects were given the chance to change what their favored 
solution was before proceeding onto the next question. 
 After subjects answered the policy questions, they answered the multiple choice 
questions. For each question subjects had to pick a favored option and then make 
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probability judgments regarding the correctness of each option. After completing these 
steps they had to list at least two reasons “for” or “against” their favored answer or 
neither, and classify their reasons like they did for the policy questions. 
 Upon answering the five questions, subjects received feedback regarding their 
answers and were asked to self-evaluate their responses. For the policy questions subjects 
were shown their solutions, their favored solution, and their arguments. Then they were 
asked to self-evaluate their reasoning for the shown question in terms of how successfully 
they applied the principles of AOT. For the multiple choice questions subjects saw the 
same information and did the same self-evaluation, but they were also told what the 
correct answers to the questions were. 
 At the end of the training subjects took a 7-item survey like in the previous 
training to rate their learning experience on a 5-item scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 3 = 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree) and were asked to submit any 
additional comments they had before being forwarded onto the post-training part of the 
study as in Study 6. 
 Questions. The questions were the same as those used in Study 6. A full list of 
questions and answers along with their difficulty and discrimination scores can be found 
in Appendix B-1. 
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-1). The instructions and the 
first part of the study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/
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args10a.html for the control condition, and on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/
args/args10b.html for the training condition. The instructions and the last part of the study 
can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args10post.html.  
 Subjects were randomly assigned either to a training condition or to a control 
condition (Ncontrol = 60; Ntraining = 51 after attrition). Every subject first did the 20-question 
task and took the AOT scale (see Appendix C). This task was the same as the ones in 
Study 6. After completing the task, the subjects who were assigned to the training 
condition were forwarded to the link to go through their training. Upon completing the 
training, subjects were forwarded to the same 20-question task they did before. Those 
who were in the control condition were forwarded to a page where they were told to re-
answer the questions they did in the first part and that doing this could improve their 
performance. At the end of the last part all subjects took the AOT scale again. As in the 
previous studies, after the data collection was completed, the classifications of reasons 
were checked by one of the authors (BG) to ensure that subjects’ reasons were classified 
correctly. 
Summary and Discussion of Results 
 In this study we tried to improve on the AOT training module we devised in Study 
6. Subjects were given more opportunity to practice AOT skills during the training. We 
were able to replicate our results from previous studies. 
 As in most studies, we did not observe a correlation between the AOT measures, 
and the correlation between the Brier scores and our new AOT measure was small and 
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not significant. A similar result was also observed in the linear mixed-effect models 
where we tested the effect of the new measure on the accuracy scores. However, further 
analyses showed that the effect of this measure on the Brier scores is dependent on 
whether subjects were correct or not such that when subjects answered the questions 
incorrectly, scoring higher on AOT measure from reasons was associated with lower 
Brier scores, while in the cases where subjects answered the questions correctly, scoring 
higher on AOT measure from reasons was associated with higher Brier scores. 
Additionally, this AOT measure had no effect on subjects’ being correct on a given 
question. These analyses explain the correlation we have observed over multiple studies 
where the correlation between Brier scores and the AOT from measure scores got 
stronger as the question difficulty increased. These results might also shed some light 
onto the lack of correlation between the two AOT measures. While AOT-Beliefs indicates 
one’s overall tendency for good thinking, AOT-Reasons seems to be more task-specific in 
indicating good thinking behavior. 
 We used two overconfidence measures to look at the effects of AOT measures on 
subjects’ overconfidence. Both overconfidence measures indicated that subjects were 
overconfident in their judgments. Correlations we ran between each overconfidence 
measure and AOT-Reasons did not yield statistically significant results in the first round 
data, while the results were statistically significant in the second round data. The linear 
mixed-effect models we ran showed that higher scores on AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons 
were associated with lower overconfidence. These results are comparable to the results 
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we observed in previous studies. We also found some partial support for our hypothesis 
that going through AOT training reduced overconfidence from the first round to the 
second round in the study.  
 Further comparisons of training and control conditions showed that going through 
the training increased subjects’ scores on both AOT measures. Subjects in the training 
condition did not have lower Brier scores than those in the control condition, but the 
number of questions answered correctly were greater for the training condition subjects 
than the control condition subjects. These results are puzzling, but this might be 
explained by a combination of two factors. Writing more reasons against preferred 
answers reduces subjects’ confidence, and therefore, even when the subjects pick the 
correct answer they do not assign the proper confidence judgment, and/or subjects’ 
confidence judgments are not accurate enough such that they might show 
underconfidence when correct as well as overconfidence when incorrect, and since the 
calculation of Brier scores is a combination of their confidence and ability to answer the 
question correctly, we might not see an improvement in their accuracy scores based on 
Brier scores even if we observe improvement in their AOT skills and overconfidence. 
 In the previous studies we observed that the effect of AOT-Reasons was 
dependent on whether subjects answered the questions correctly or not. With this idea in 
mind, we compared the changes in subjects’ Brier scores between the first and second 
round responses between the two conditions when subjects answered the questions 
incorrectly, and we observed that when subjects did not know the correct answer to the 
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question, going through the AOT training helped with their Brier scores. This result was 
not observed when subjects knew the correct answers.  
 The t-tests we ran to see whether going through the AOT training would reduce 
subjects overconfidence showed that subjects in the control condition showed a smaller 
change in their overconfidence scores than those subjects in the training condition, but 
these changes were statistically significant when we used the overconfidence measure 
that compared subjects’ mean probability judgments for their preferred options to the 
percentage of questions they answered correctly, but not when we used our new 
overconfidence measure that took the probability judgments for three options into 
consideration. Even though our results were not always statistically significant, we 
observed that going through the AOT training decreased subjects’ overconfidence. 
 In the section below we go into more detail about the analyses we conducted to 
reach these conclusions. 
Results 
 Since this study had a within-subject design, we used both the first round and the 
second round data for the analysis of individual differences, and the effects of training 
were evaluated by comparing the differences between the rounds of the training condition 
to the differences between the rounds of the control condition. When reporting the results 
of individual differences analyses, the first set of statistics come from the first round data, 
and the second set of statistics come from the second round data unless indicated 
otherwise.  
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 We only excluded one subject from the computation of AOT-Reasons, and any 
analysis that involves this measure, because this subject failed to provide any relevant 
reasons for their answers, but instead put in “think so” twice for each question and 
categorized this reason as support for why they picked that particular option. 
Individual Differences Measures for Actively Open Minded Thinking 
 The subjects’ AOT-Beliefs scores ranged from -1.364 to 1.818 (MR1 = 0.719, SDR1 
= 0.599) in the first round, and from -1.273 to 1.909 (MR2 = 0.785, SDR2 = 0.677) in the 
second round of the task.  The AOT-Reasons scores ranged from 0.00 to 1.50 (MR1 = 
0.36,  SDR1 = 0.348), and from 0.00 to 2.00 (MR2 = 0.37, SDR2 = 0.394) in the second 
round of the task. A Pearson’s product moment correlation between AOT-Beliefs and 
mean AOT-Reasons was not statistically significant in either rounds of the data (r1 = 
0.007, t(129) = 0.08, p = 0.94, two-tailed; r2 = 0.01, t(108) = 0.11, p = 0.91, two-tailed). 
 Next we tested whether higher AOT-Beliefs scores were associated with lower 
Brier scores. There was a moderate correlation between these two variables in the first 
round data, r1 = -0.31, t(125) = -3.58, p < 0.001, one-tailed, while the correlation was 
smaller in the second round data, r2 = -0.21, t(104) = -2.16, p = 0.02, one-tailed. Subjects 
who had higher scores on AOT-Beliefs had lower Brier scores than those who scored 
lower on AOT-Beliefs. We also wanted to know whether a similar relation to the one 
observed between Brier scores and AOT-Beliefs would also exist between Brier scores 
and mean AOT-Reasons scores. Specifically, we hypothesized that the greater mean AOT-
Reasons score is, the lower the subject’s mean Brier score would be. The observed 
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correlations were too small and not statistically significant in either round, r1 = -0.05, 
t(125)= -0.60, p = 0.28, one-tailed; r2 = -0.12, t(104)= -1.22, p = 0.11, one-tailed. Finally, 
we looked at how the correlation between Brier scores and mean AOT-Reasons behaved 
as the question difficulty varied. We observed a moderate but statistically nonsignificant 
correlation in the first round data, r1 = -0.31, t(18) = -1.37, p = 0.19, two-tailed, but the 
correlation was large in the second round data, r2 = -0.58, t(18) = -3.04, p = 0.01, two-
tailed. We found partial support for the hypothesis that as the question difficulty 
increases, the relation between Brier scores and AOT-Reasons strengthens. 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We first regressed the Brier scores of subjects on 
AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed random effects. We did not observe an 
effect of the measure on subjects’ Brier scores in either dataset (-0.002, 95% c.i. -0.033 to 
0.030, Wald method; -0.014, 95% c.i. -0.050 to 0.022, Wald method). One reason why we 
did not observe any effect of AOT-Reasons could be that the usefulness of considering 
alternative reasons might be dependent on subjects’ knowing the correct answer to the 
question. If a subject knows the correct answer, they might not feel the need to list 
alternative reasons. To test this hypothesis we first regressed the Brier scores of subjects 
on AOT-Reasons and Correct (whether subjects guessed the answer correctly where 1 = 
correct and 0 = incorrect with subjects and items as crossed random effects). AOT-
Reasons on its own had no effect on subjects’ Brier scores again in the first round data 
(-0.009, 95% c.i. -0.030 to 0.012, Wald method), but it did in the second round data 
(-0.028, 95% c.i. -0.051 to -0.005, Wald method), and as it would be expected Correct did 
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have an effect on the Brier scores in both rounds (-0.408, 95% c.i. -0.423 to -0.392, Wald 
method; -0.442, 95% c.i. -0.459 to -0.426, Wald method). We also observed an interaction 
effect of AOT-Reasons and Correct on the Brier scores in both rounds (0.060, 95% c.i. 
0.041 to 0.079, Wald method; 0.103, 95% c.i. 0.082 to 0.124, Wald method).  
 To get a better understanding of what is going on, we split our data into two based 
on whether subjects guessed a specific question correctly or incorrectly. For each dataset, 
we regressed subjects’ Brier scores on AOT-Reasons with subjects and items as crossed 
random effects. The results showed a good effect when subjects guessed the question 
incorrectly such that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower Brier scores 
(-0.063, 95% c.i. -0.101 to -0.029, Wald method; -0.112, 95% c.i. -0.159 to -0.066, Wald 
method).  However, when subjects answered the question correctly, we observed a bad 31
effect of AOT-Reasons on subjects’ Brier scores such that higher AOT-Reasons scores 
were associated with higher Brier scores(0.043, 95% c.i. 0.023 to 0.065, Wald method; 
0.054, 95% c.i. 0.032 to 0.076, Wald method).  Finally, we ran a generalized linear 32
mixed-effect model to determine any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct but we did not 
observe any effect of AOT-Reasons on Correct (-0.079, 95% c.i. -0.245 to 0.086, Wald 
method; -0.057, 95% c.i. -0.271 to 0.157, Wald method). It seems that subjects’ being 
correct on a given question is not dependent upon subjects’ AOT-Reasons scores. These 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 31
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct<0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for incorrectly answered questions.
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(BS ~ Ar+(1+Ar|S)+(1+Ar|C),d1[d1$Correct<0,]), where 32
BS is Brier scores, Ar is AOT-Reasons, S is subjects, C is items, and d1[d1$Correct>0,] is the 
data frame that only contained data for correctly answered questions.
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analyses explain the strengthening of the correlation between Brier scores and AOT-
Reasons scores as the difficulty of questions increases. Since subjects are more likely to 
answer difficult questions wrong, writing more alternative reasons as to why their 
preferred option might be wrong lowers their Brier scores.  
 Next we regressed the Brier scores of subjects on their AOT-Beliefs scores with 
subjects and items as crossed random effects. We observed an effect of AOT-Beliefs on 
the Brier scores in both rounds (-0.104, 95% c.i. -0.162 to -0.047, Wald method; -0.063, 
95% c.i. -0.121 to -0.006, Wald method). Higher AOT-Beliefs scores were associated 
with lower Brier scores. 
Overconfidence and Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 We again used two overconfidence measures in assessing the relations between 
AOT and overconfidence. The first measure, Over1, compared subjects’ probability 
judgments for their preferred answers to the percentage of correct answers. The second 
measure, Over2, compared subjects’ expected Brier scores (EBS, see the results section 
of Studies 1A and 1B for an explanation of this measure) to their actual Brier scores. In 
the first round data we observed that, for both measures, the mean overconfidence scores 
were positive, meaning that subjects were overconfident in their probability judgments 
(MOver1 = 0.11; MOver2 = 0.19). In the second round data, we once again observed positive 
overconfidence scores, but these scores were slightly lower than the first round 
overconfidence scores (MOver1 = 0.08; MOver2 = 0.17). 
!89
 The correlations between AOT-Reasons and each overconfidence measure were 
small and statistically non-significant in the first round data (with Over1 as the 
overconfidence measure: rOver1, R1 = -0.10, t(125) = -1.16, p = 0.07, one-tailed; with 
Over2 as the overconfidence measure: rOver2, R1 = -0.13, t(125) = -1.47, p = 0.12, one-
tailed). In the second round data the correlation between each overconfidence measure 
and AOT-Reasons was statistically significant (with Over1 as the overconfidence 
measure: rOver1, R2 = -0.18, t(104) = -1.88, p = 0.03, one-tailed; with Over2 as the 
overconfidence measure: rOver2, R2 = -0.21, t(104) = -2.22, p = 0.01, one-tailed), showing 
that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower overconfidence.  
 Additionally, we looked at the correlations between AOT-Beliefs and each 
overconfidence measure. Using Over1 as the overconfidence measure, we observed a 
negative correlation between overconfidence and AOT-Beliefs scores (r1 = -0.28, t(125) = 
-3.30, p < 0.001, one-tailed; r2 = -0.21, t(104) = -2.16, p = 0.02, one-tailed). Similarly, 
using Over2 as the overconfidence measure, we observed a negative correlation between 
overconfidence and AOT-Beliefs scores in both rounds (r1 = -0.28, t(125) = -3.32, p < 
0.001, one-tailed; r2 = -0.22, t(104) = -2.28, p = 0.01, one-tailed) again, showing that 
higher scores on AOT was associated with lower overconfidence. 
 Linear Mixed-Effect Models. We regressed the variable Over2 (the difference 
between mean actual Brier scores and mean expected Brier scores) on AOT-Reasons with 
subjects and items as crossed random effects. Our analysis showed a significant effect of 
AOT-Reasons on the overconfidence measure on both rounds of data (-0.039, 95% c.i. 
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-0.072 to -0.006, Wald method; -0.062, 95% c.i. -0.099 to -0.025, Wald method). Subjects 
who wrote more reasons that went against their preferred answers were less 
overconfident about their answers. Similarly, regressing Over2 on subjects’ AOT-Beliefs 
scores with subjects and items as crossed random effects also showed a significant effect 
of AOT-Beliefs on the overconfidence measure on both rounds of data (-0.121, 95% c.i. 
-0.193 to -0.049, Wald method; -0.086, 95% c.i. -0.160 to -0.012, Wald method). Subjects 
who scored higher on AOT-Beliefs showed lower overconfidence in their answers. 
 We also regressed subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred answer (Prob 
from now on) on AOT-Reasons with items and subjects as crossed random effects.  We 33
observed a statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on Prob such that higher AOT-
Reasons scores were associated with lower probability judgments in both rounds (-0.041, 
95% c.i. -0.054 to -0.027, Wald method; -0.057, 95% c.i. -0.073 to -0.040, Wald method). 
A linear mixed-effect model regressing Prob on AOT-Reasons and Correct with items and 
subjects as crossed random effects showed an effect of AOT-Reasons (-0.039, 95% c.i. 
-0.053 to -0.026, Wald method; -0.057, 95% c.i. -0.073 to -0.041, Wald method) and an 
effect of Correct on Prob in both rounds (0.029, 95% c.i. 0.023 to 0.036, Wald method; 
0.024, 95% c.i. 0.017 to 0.032, Wald method).   Scoring high on AOT-Reasons was 34
associated with lower probability judgments for preferred answers, and answering 
 The lmer function used in R was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|S),d1), where Ar is AOT-33
Reasons, C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
 The lmer function in R for this model was lmer(Prob ~ Ar + Correct + (1+Ar|C) + (1+Ar|34
S),d1), where C is items, S is subjects, and d1 is the data frame used.
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questions correctly was associated with higher probability judgments for preferred 
answers. We were able to replicate the results we observed in previous studies. 
Additional Correlation Tests 
 We also looked at the relation between subjects’ mean number of reasons (Nreas.s 
from now on) they wrote and their Brier scores. We hypothesized that higher number of 
reasons written would be correlated with lower Brier scores. We did not observe a 
correlation between these two variables in the first round data (r = -0.03, t(125) = -0.34, p 
= 0.37, one-tailed), and in the second round data we observed a small but statistically 
non-significant correlation (r = -0.14, t(104) = -1.40, p = 0.08, one-tailed). We did not 
observe a correlation between Nreas.s and AOT-Beliefs in the first round data (r = 0.09, 
t(129) = 1.08, p = 0.14, one-tailed), and in the second round data we observed a small but 
statistically non-significant correlation, r = 0.13, t(108) = 1.32, p = 0.09, one-tailed. We 
were not able to replicate the results we observed in Study 6. 
Comparisons Between the Control and Training Conditions 
 We finally investigated whether the actively open-minded thinking training had 
any effects on subjects’ accuracy scores, overconfidence, and the individual differences in 
actively open-minded thinking. We expected the subjects in the training condition to have 
greater change in their Brier scores as compared to those in the control condition, but did 
not observe any differences between the conditions, t = -0.34, p = 0.37, N = 111, one-
tailed (Mcontrol = 0.034, Mtraining = 0.041). However, a t-test looking at the differences 
between mean Brier scores between the two conditions, where we only included data 
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from questions where subjects were incorrect, showed that compared to the control 
condition, the training condition improved their Brier scores as a result of training, t = 
-2.03, p = 0.02, N = 111, one-tailed (Mcontrol = -0.039, Mtraining = 0.036). When we 
conducted the same two-sample t-test with items where subjects guessed the answer 
correctly, we did not observe an effect of improvement in Brier scores as a result of 
training, t = 0.42, p = 0.34, N = 111, one-tailed (Mcontrol = 0.007, Mtraining = -0.001). We 
additionally looked at the difference between subjects’ accuracy scores based on Correct 
(see above for how this score is calculated), and observed that subjects in the training 
condition improved their accuracy more than those in the control condition, t = -1.80, p = 
0.04, N = 111, one-tailed (Mcontrol = 0.028, Mtraining = 0.065). 
 To assess the relation between training and overconfidence we subtracted the 
second round mean overconfidence measure from the first round mean overconfidence 
measure, and ran a Welch Two Sample paired t-test to compare the differences between 
subjects in the control and training conditions. We calculated the changes in mean 
overconfidence scores in this way for both Over1 and Over2 measures. We expected that 
the range differences in the control condition should be smaller than those in the training 
condition. Using Over1 as the overconfidence measure, we observed a significant 
difference between control and training subjects’ overconfidence score changes such that 
control condition subjects showed less change in their overconfidence score between the 
two rounds than the training condition subjects did, t = -2.53, p = 0.01, N = 111, one-
tailed (Mcontrol = 0.007, Mtraining = 0.065). Using Over2 as the overconfidence measure, we 
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observed a smaller difference between control and training subjects’ overconfidence 
score changes such that control condition subjects showed less change in their 
overconfidence score between the two rounds than the training condition subjects did, 
and this difference between the two conditions was not statistically significant, t = -1.33, 
p = 0.09, N = 111, one-tailed (Mcontrol = 0.013, Mtraining = 0.040). A third analysis used the 
difference between the maximum and minimum probabilities subjects assigned in each 
question for both rounds of the task. We took an arithmetic mean of these values, and 
subtracted the values of the first round from the second round to compare the differences 
in a Welch Two Sample paired t-test in the two conditions. We hypothesized that the 
range differences in the control condition should be smaller than those in the training 
condition, and this hypothesis was supported,  t = -1.68, p = 0.05, N = 111, one-tailed 
(Mcontrol = -0.026, Mtraining = 0.009). 
 We looked at the differences both in AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons between both 
rounds of the study. We observed that people in the training condition showed a change in 
their AOT-Beliefs scores for the better, t = 2.11, p = 0.02, N = 111, one-tailed (Mcontrol = 
-0.030, Mtraining = 0.157). Next we hypothesized that subjects in the control condition 
would show a smaller change in the number of reasons they listed that were against their 
preferred options than those in the training condition. We subtracted subjects’ mean AOT-
Reasons scores in the first round from those in the second round, and ran a Welch Two 
Sample paired test to compare the subjects in the two conditions. We observed that the 
change in AOT-Reasons was smaller for the subjects in the control condition than those 
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in the training condition as expected, t = -5.06, p < 0.001, N = 111, one-tailed (Mcontrol = 
-0.053, Mtraining = 0.204). Figure 2 also shows that that the training condition subjects 
increased the mean number of reasons they listed against their preferred options as 
compared to the control condition subjects.  
!95
Figure 2. The figure shows each subject’s AOT-Reasons scores in the first and second 
rounds of Study 7. Red diamonds are training condition subjects, while black diamonds 
are control condition subjects. The gray diagonal line indicates where the data points 
would be if there was no change in AOT-Reasons scores. When subjects’ AOT-Reasons 
scores showed an increase in the second round compared to the first round, they fall 
above the gray line. When subjects’ AOT-Reasons scores showed a decrease in the 
second round compared to the first round, they fall below the gray line. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In this dissertation, we investigated individual differences in AOT by using belief 
and behavioral measures, and tested the effectiveness of a simple intervention and online 
AOT training modules in improving subjects’ thinking and accuracy. Table 3 shows the 
summary results from correlation tests, Table 4 shows the summary results from linear 
mixed-effect models, and Table 5 shows the summary results from the t-tests we ran. 
Belief vs. Behavioral Measures of Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
 The behavioral measure we tested took subjects’ reasons into consideration since 
an important component of AOT behavior is one’s tendency to think of arguments or 
reasons that go against their initially favored beliefs or conclusions. This behavioral 
measure has an advantage over Baron’s short AOT scale, because it measures subjects’ 
actual thinking behavior rather than their beliefs about thinking. We expected these two 
measures to be correlated with one another, but over seven studies, only one study (Study 
3) showed a statistically significant correlation between these two measures (see Table 3 
for a summary of correlations run in all studies).  
Accuracy Scores and Actively Open-Minded Thinking Measures 
 We used Brier scores to measure accuracy in subjects’ probabilistic judgments in 
most studies, but used two different measures based on subjects’ point and interval 
estimates in Studies 3 and 5. Correlations run between AOT measures and Brier scores 
did not yield consistent and statistically significant results. AOT-Beliefs correlated 
negatively with Brier scores in all studies but Study 1B, but these correlations were not 
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always statistically significant. The correlations between AOT-Reasons and Brier scores 
were not statistically significant with the exception of Study 1B. Study 3 showed 
significant correlations with both measures when the accuracy measure was based on 
subjects’ interval estimates but not when the accuracy was based on subjects’ best 
estimate error.  
 We were surprised by the lack of a statistically significant correlation between 
AOT-Reasons and Brier scores, especially because AOT-Reasons scores were almost 
consistently correlated with the overconfidence measure such that people who scored 
high on AOT-Reasons had lower overconfidence, while AOT-Reasons had no significant 
effect on the accuracy score based on subjects’ correct answers except in Study 1B (Table 
4). A possible explanation we came up with for the lack of correlation between AOT-
Reasons and Brier scores was that the relation between these two variables might be 
affected by question difficulty. We calculated question difficulty by looking at the 
average number of subjects who answered a particular question correctly. Correlating this 
difficulty measure with the correlation coefficients between AOT-Reasons and Brier 
scores confirmed our hypothesis such that more difficult questions were associated with 
higher correlations between AOT-Reasons and Brier scores. The linear mixed-effect 
models we ran provided further support to our hypothesis. When subjects did not answer 
the questions correctly, higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower, and thus, 
better Brier scores (see Table 4 for a summary of all the linear mixed-effect models we 
ran over 7 studies). The beta coefficient for the AOT-Reasons variable was statistically 
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significant in all studies but the second study, but the coefficient was still in the expected 
direction in this study. This relation we observed between AOT-Reasons and Brier scores 
disappeared or reversed when subjects answered the questions correctly. 
 Given these results, it seems that AOT-Reasons and AOT-Beliefs are related 
measures of actively open-minded thinking, yet they do not overlap perfectly. AOT-
Reasons measure is most useful when there is greater question difficulty or uncertainty of 
outcomes, and can differentiate the individual differences in AOT when people do not or 
cannot know the absolute correct answer as in the case of forecasting questions. AOT-
Beliefs, on the other hand, is a more general measure that tells us about how individuals 
think they should think.  
 When we started pilot testing for this dissertation, the 7-item version of the AOT 
scale did not include any questions regarding information search. Baron et al. (2015) used 
a version of the AOT scale with an eighth item that included a “search for information” 
item, which we also included in Studies 1A and 1B. Starting with Study 2, we added 
three more “search for information items.” Even though we did not allow our subjects to 
look up information regarding the questions, they still had to search their own knowledge 
base to be able to come up with reasons. The original 7 items in the AOT scale did not 
address the search part, so we felt it was necessary to add these search items in order to 
improve task and measure correspondence. Thus, AOT-Beliefs measure, in its current 
form, is useful in assessing individual differences in how people think about thinking in 
general, regardless of whether they know the correct answer or the outcome. However, as 
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we mentioned before, it is still a self-report measure, and we cannot exclude social 
desirability effects or the discrepancy between actual thinking behavior and reported 
thinking tendencies. 
Overconfidence and Actively Open-Minded Thinking Measures 
 We measured overconfidence in subjects’ judgments in two ways. The first 
measure compared subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred answers to the 
percentage of their correct answers. The second measure utilized subjects’ probability 
judgments for all possible options, and compared them to subjects’ Brier scores. The 
correlations we ran using either overconfidence measure had comparable results. Using 
the first measure, we observed AOT-Reasons scores were negatively correlated with 
overconfidence in all studies even though these correlations did not reach statistical 
significance (Table 3). Similarly, using the second overconfidence measure, we observed 
negative correlations in all studies but Study 6. Higher AOT-Reasons scores were 
associated with lower overconfidence. Linear mixed-effect models also showed a 
statistically significant effect of AOT-Reasons on overconfidence except in Study 2 such 
that higher AOT-Reasons scores were associated with lower overconfidence.  
Additionally, AOT-Reasons had a statistically significant effect on the probability 
judgments subjects made for their preferred answers in all studies. Similar to its effect on 
overconfidence, scoring high on AOT-Reasons were associated with lower probability 
judgments for the preferred options. It seems that writing reasons against preferred 
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answers lowers subjects’ unwarranted confidence, which partially explains lower Brier 
scores, as this accuracy measure utilizes subjects’ probability judgments as well. 
 The correlations between AOT-Beliefs measure and overconfidence was less 
consistent than those between AOT-Reasons and overconfidence. Using either 
overconfidence measure, AOT-Beliefs was correlated negatively with overconfidence in 
only 4 studies, and in only 2 studies, this correlation was statistically significant (Table 
3). Similarly, linear mixed-effect models showed a significant effect of AOT-Beliefs on 
overconfidence in only two studies (Table 4). Thus, even though it seemed that higher 
AOT-Beliefs scores were associated with lower overconfidence, this relation was not 
consistent over 7 studies. 
Interventions for Myside Bias 
 In Studies 4 and 5, we required subjects to list at least one reason against their 
preferred answer in half of the questions (Twoside condition). In Study 4, we observed 
that the Twoside condition had higher AOT-Reasons than the control condition, wrote 
more reasons than those in the control condition. We also observed that the Twoside 
condition had lower, and thus better, Brier scores and showed lower overconfidence than 
the control condition, but these results were not statistically significant (see Table 5 for a 
summary of the comparison t-tests run). We similarly observed a statistically significant 
effect of Twoside condition on AOT-Reasons such that compared to the control condition, 
the AOT-Reasons scores were higher in Twoside condition (Table 4). These results show 
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that our experimental manipulation was successful in getting people to consider 
alternative reasons, which in turn helped them lower their overconfidence.  
 Furthermore, we observed an effect of the Twoside condition on Brier scores, but 
this result was not statistically significant. Given that we found a situational usefulness of 
writing alternative reasons in our task, we hypothesized that our Twoside instructions 
could also be most effective when subjects did not answer the questions correctly. This 
hypothesis was confirmed. When subjects answered the questions incorrectly, the 
Twoside condition had a good effect on subjects’ Brier scores such that the Twoside 
instructions led to lower Brier scores. This effect was reversed when subjects knew the 
correct answers. The effect of the Twoside condition on Brier scores became statistically 
non-significant, and the direction of this effect was in the opposite direction. It seemed 
that writing opposite reasons when one knew the correct answer, hurt her Brier scores.   
 This result makes sense if we consider how thinking about alternative reasons 
lead to better judgments. The Twoside intervention makes other answer options more 
salient by forcing people to generate reasons that do not support their preferred answers, 
which in turn, decreases the amount of confidence people might have assigned to their 
initially favored answers. This mechanism is helpful when subjects do not know the 
correct answer, as it decreases unwarranted confidence subjects might have. However, it 
seems that this intervention overcorrects subjects’ confidence when they know the correct 
answer, and therefore leading to worse Brier scores. If the correct answer is known, the 
assigned probability to this answer should be 1. Any lower probability judgment will lead 
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to non-optimal Brier scores. Therefore, if the correct answer is known, there is no need 
for the subject to seek alternative reasons as to why they might be wrong. Just like the 
AOT-Reasons measure, this intervention is most useful when used in scenarios of 
uncertainty and low information conditions. 
 Despite the success of the Twoside intervention in Study 4, we did not observe 
any effect of a similar intervention in Study 5, where we used numerical estimation 
questions rather than categorical probability judgment questions. As we mentioned 
before, this was probably due to a more general failure of the experimental design (as we 
also did not observe any of the other relationships outside of the intervention) rather than 
just specific to the instructions we used in this study. 
Training Adults in Actively-Open Minded Thinking 
 We made two attempts at training adults in AOT. Study 6 used a between-subject 
design while Study 7 used a within-subject design to test the effect of training on people’s 
AOT-Reasons scores, AOT-Beliefs scores, Brier scores, and overconfidence. Table 5 
summarizes the comparison results from these two studies.  
 In Study 6 we observed that subjects who went through the AOT training had 
higher AOT-Reasons scores and lower Brier scores than those who did not go through the 
training, but this difference between the two conditions was not statistically significant. 
Using either overconfidence measure, we did not observe lower overconfidence in 
training condition subjects as compared to the control condition subjects either. However, 
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subjects in the training condition did write significantly more reasons than those in the 
control condition.  
 Even though these results showed that training adults in AOT is possible via a 
short training, it did not lead to any statistically significant changes in either AOT 
measures, Brier scores, or overconfidence. Therefore, we repeated the study with an 
improved training module, where we tried to encourage subjects to generate more 
alternative reasons, put the concepts they learned into practice, and provided more 
feedback. The results in Study 7 showed that subjects who went through the training 
module improved their AOT-Reasons and AOT-Beliefs scores significantly. We also 
found some support for the hypothesis that going through the training would reduce 
overconfidence from the first round to the second more compared to just doing the same 
task twice, yet this result was statistically significant only when we used the 
overconfidence measure that compared subjects’ probability judgments for their preferred 
options to the percentage of their correct answers. We also observed an improvement in 
training condition subjects’ Brier scores as compared to the control condition subjects, 
even though this difference in Brier scores changes was not statistically significant 
overall. However, similar to the results we observed in the intervention study, subjects 
seemed to benefit from the training the most when they did not know the correct answer, 
while there was no effect of the training on Brier scores when subjects knew the correct 
answer.  
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  In sum, we were able to train our subjects in AOT by using an hour long online 
training module, and the training had some success in reducing overconfidence, 
improving Brier scores, and AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons scores. 
Future Directions 
 In this dissertation, we devised a behavioral AOT measure based on subjects’ 
reasons, which had some success in predicting subjects’ Brier scores and overconfidence 
in probabilistic judgment tasks. One problem with this measure was that it was not as 
easy to score as we thought it would be. One of us (BG) had to go back and check the 
classifications of reasons by subjects, and in some cases the reasons were misclassified, 
so these had to be corrected. This was very time consuming. However, this 
misclassification problem could be solved by giving subjects a short and simple exercise 
before they start the task, where they classify reasons and receive feedback on their 
performance.  
 One might also argue that the fact that AOT-Reasons predicted Brier scores only 
when subjects did not answer the questions prevents this measure from being a more 
general behavioral measure. However, we would argue that this AOT measure is useful 
where it is most necessary. In real world situations, it is rare that the correct answer or 
solution to a decision problem can be easily found, so people more often operate in an 
uncertain world. In these circumstances, AOT-Reasons measure could be useful in 
assessing the quality of one’s thinking process while making the decision and before the 
outcome is known.  
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 A related criticism of the study concerns the questions used over 7 studies. We 
used questions with known answers, and had to instruct subjects not to gather information 
from outside sources. It was a difficult process to find questions in domains where the 
majority of subjects had enough knowledge to generate reasons, and it took us multiple 
tries to find a good mixture of questions. Even then, subjects seemed to struggle with 
some questions, and especially those that involved submitting point estimates and 
confidence interval estimates. In future studies, it would be interesting to see how the 
behavioral measure and the training we devised would predict subjects’ performance in 
other tasks that involve personal, organizational, or political forecasting type problems. It 
might also be useful to include another measure such as decision satisfaction to see 
whether people who consider more alternative reasons are more satisfied with their 
decisions after the outcome in the long run. 
 The final version of our training module was successful in changing AOT 
behavior in subjects, and improving their performance in questions where subjects did 
not know the correct answer. Given that this module was administered online and on 
average took one hour to complete, the results are promising. Our training was successful 
in encouraging subjects to consider alternative reasons, which was its main goal. 
Additionally, it affected their probability judgments to a lesser extent even though 
subjects received no specific instructions about making probability judgments during the 
training. However, we do not know how long the effect of this kind of training would 
last. It is possible that the effects of this online training would last shorter than the 
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training sessions Perkins et al. (1986), Baron et al. (1985), or Graumlich and Baron 
(1991) designed, since these decision making courses took over the course of several 
weeks. Future studies will need to investigate how lasting the effects of our online AOT 
training are. However, our training module could be a useful training tool for 
organizations who want to improve quality and accuracy of decision making of their 
employees. 
Conclusion 
 Our studies investigated the individual differences in AOT by using belief and 
behavioral measures. The behavioral measure was successful in predicting Brier scores 
and overconfidence, especially in cases where subjects did not know the correct answer, 
but it also furthered our understanding of how AOT improves the accuracy of 
probabilistic judgments. The belief measure was also associated with Brier scores and 
overconfidence, especially starting with studies where we added three “search” items to 
the existing AOT scale.  
 In Chapter 2, we also looked at the effect of a myside bias intervention, which 
required people to list reasons against their preferred answers. This intervention was most 
successful in increasing subjects’ Brier scores, when they did not know the correct 
answer. Finally, we tested two different versions of short AOT training modules. The 
training increased subjects’ AOT-Beliefs and AOT-Reasons scores, and improved their 
Brier scores when subjects did not answer the questions correctly. We also observed some 
effect of training on subjects’ overconfidence. 
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Table 3. This table summarizes the results from correlations run over 7 studies. “+” 
indicates statistically significant results in the expected direction; “(+)” indicates 
statistically non-significant results in the expected direction; “—” indicates statistically 
significant results in the opposite direction; “(—)” indicated statistically non-significant 
results in the opposite direction; and blank cells are those where a specific analysis was 
not run. Study 5 is not included since no relations were observed. Study 7 was a within-
subject design study, and we report the results from both rounds. R1 corresponds to the 
first round of the study, while R2 corresponds to the second round of the study. 
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Correlations Studies
Variable 1 Variable 2 1A 1B 2 3 4 6 7 (R1)
7         
(R2)
AOT-Beliefs AOT-Reasons (—) (—) (+) + (—) (+) (+) (+)
AOT-Beliefs Brier scores (+) (—) + (+) + + +
AOT-Reasons Brier scores (+) + (—) (+) (—) (+) (+)
AOT-Beliefs Best estimate error          (Besterror) (+)
AOT-Reasons Best estimate error          (Besterror) (+)
AOT-Beliefs Interval estimate error (Overconf) +
AOT-Reasons Interval estimate error (Overconf) +
mean Brier scores
corr. coef. between 
AOT-Reasons and 
Brier scores
(+) + (+) + (+) (+) +
Overconfidence      
(Over1) AOT-Reasons (+) + (+) (+) (+) (+) +
Overconfidence     
(Over1) AOT-Beliefs (—) (—) (+) (+) + + +
Overconfidence     
(Over2) AOT-Reasons (+) + (+) (+) — (+) +
Overconfidence     
(Over2) AOT-Beliefs (—) (—) (+) (+) + + +
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Table 5. This table summarizes the results from t-tests run in Studies 4, 6, and 7. “+” 
indicates statistically significant effects in the expected direction; “(+)” indicates 
statistically non-significant effects in the expected direction; “—” indicates statistically 
significant effects in the opposite direction; “(—)” indicates statistically non-significant 
effects in the opposite direction; and blank cells are those where a specific model was not 
run. Study 5 is not included since no statistically significant results were observed. 
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Studies
Hypotheses Tested 4 6 7
Subjects in the experimental condition have higher AOT-
Reasons scores (Studies 4 and 6) or improved their AOT-
Reasons scores more (Study 7) than those in the control 
condition.
+ (+) +
Subjects in the experimental condition have higher AOT-
Beliefs scores (Study 6) or improved their AOT-Beliefs 
scores more (Study 7) than those in the control condition.
(—) +
When subjects did not know the correct answer, those in the 
experimental condition improved their Brier scores more 
than those in the control condition.
+
When subjects knew the correct answer, those in the 
experimental condition improved their Brier scores more 
than those in the control condition.
(—)
Subjects in the experimental condition have lower Brier 
scores (Studies 4 and 6) or improved their Brier scores more 
(Study 7) than those in the control condition.
(+) (+) (+)
Subjects in the experimental condition wrote more reasons 
than those in the control condition. + +
Using Over1 as the overconfidence measure, subjects in the 
experimental condition were less overconfident (Studies 4 
and 6) or their overconfidence diminished from R1 to R2 
more (Study 7) than those in the control condition.
(+) (—) +
Using Over2 as the overconfidence measure, subjects in the 
experimental condition were less overconfident (Studies 4 
and 6) or their overconfidence diminished from R1 to R2 
more (Study 7) than those in the control condition.
(+) (—) (+)
APPENDIX A: PILOT STUDIES 
Pilot Studies 1A and 1B 
The main purpose of this study was to look at the individual differences in actively open-
minded thinking, with a focus on people’s ability to be able to come up with arguments 
against their favored judgments. Additionally we looked at different types of prediction 
questions so that we could ask subjects questions that would appeal to their knowledge 
base. We divided all the questions we came up with into two studies, and aimed for half 
of our recruited subjects to do one set of questions, and the other half a second set of the 
questions. Therefore, we report the method and results from these studies together. 
Method 
 Subjects in Pilot Study 1A. Thirty-one subjects participated in this study. The 
subjects’ age ranged from 25 to 78 (Median = 51); 71% were female. The subjects were 
from a panel of about 1200 people who volunteered to do studies for pay on the Internet 
over the last 15 years, through advertising, links from various web sites, and word of 
mouth. They were mostly Americans, varying considerably in age, income, and education 
level, but with women over-represented. Subjects who did not take previous studies 
seriously had been removed over the years. The panel was divided into three groups in 
order to use different samples for closely related studies. Subjects were paid $5 for this 
study (through PayPal). To be paid, they had to provide full identification associated with 
a single e-mail address. A pool of about 200 subjects was notified by e-mail when the 
study was ready, and the study was removed after 24 hours. 
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 Subjects in Pilot Study 1B. Forty-two subjects participated in this study. The 
subjects’ age ranged from 22 to 70 (Median = 48.5); 69% were female. The make-up of 
the subjects in this study was similar to the one in Pilot Study 1A since the subjects were 
from the same panel. Subjects were paid $5 for this study, and once the e-mail 
notification about the availability of the study was sent out, subjects could access it for 24 
hours. 
 Questions in Pilot Study 1A. Twenty-five questions with three-choice options 
were presented to subjects in the same order. We used a fixed order for this study to 
reduce extraneous variance. The questions were chosen from domains where subjects 
would be able to list both for and against arguments. The first ten questions asked 
subjects to guess which U.S. metropolitan area was the largest. The cities were chosen 
from a list on the Internet (“Cities and metropolitan areas,” n. d.). The next five questions 
were syllogism questions modified to have three options from Baron et al. (2015), and 
was part of a list of new Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) questions. The last ten 
questions were matrix questions picked from Carter and Russell (2007). Appendix B-2 
lists the questions and answers presented to the subjects. 
 Questions in Pilot Study 1B. Subjects answered 22 questions with three choice 
options A, B, and C in the same order. The first ten questions asked subjects which U.S. 
metropolitan area was the largest. The cities were chosen from a list on the Internet 
(“Cities and metropolitan areas,” n. d.). The next four questions were syllogism questions 
modified to have three choice options from Baron et al. (2015) and were part of a list of 
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new CRT questions. The next three questions were also CRT questions chosen from the 
same paper. The last five questions were word analogy questions picked from an SAT/
GRE test book titled 501 Word Analogy Questions (2002). 
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-2). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args1a.html 
(Pilot Study 1A) and  http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args1b.html (Pilot 
Study 1B).  
 The subjects were told that they would be asked a number of difficult questions, 
each with three possible answers A, B, and C. They were informed that the experimenter 
was interested in how they thought about answers. Once they read the instructions, they 
could enter their age, gender, and e-mail address, and proceed with the study. Subjects 
answered one question on each page. On each page, they saw a short note telling them 
more about what the question is asking and were given definitions of terms where 
necessary (see Appendix C-2). They were also given some example reasons. Below the 
short instruction the subjects saw the question with three options, and underneath that 
they were given ten note spaces to list their reasons for and against their preferred answer. 
They were not required to use all ten spaces but they had to write at least one reason. 
After listing reasons, they were asked to indicate their preferred answer, and then they 
were asked to state the probability that their preferred answer was correct. The subjects 
were given choices for probabilities, and were instructed to choose the one that was 
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closest to what they think. The options for probability judgments were 0, 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 
40, 50, 60, 70, 90, 95, 99, and 100 (in percent). After completing the page, they could 
move onto the the next page by clicking a button where they could classify their reasons 
as being for or against the choice options. Once they completed the classification task, 
they moved onto the next page, again by clicking a button, where they were presented 
with a new question and they repeated the same procedure for the remaining questions.  
 After answering all questions, the subjects were presented with an Actively Open-
Minded (AOT) scale (see Table 1). In this survey, subjects read eight statements about 
beliefs about thinking, and were asked to indicate their agreement with each statement on 
a 5-point scale (1 = completely agree, 5 = completely disagree). Once they completed the 
survey, they clicked a button to submit their responses. 
Results 
Very few subjects wrote more than one reason, which did not give us enough data 
to investigate individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Looking at the 
average number of reasons written by subject for each question showed that the average 
number of reasons written for each question was smaller than 2. Subjects also reported 
that the questions were too difficult, which we confirmed by calculating their accuracy 
scores. Here we report some results for both studies as these studies were the same except 
for the questions asked. 
We first calculated actively open-minded thinking scale scores for each subject 
based on the eight-item AOT scale subjects took at the end of the survey. We first 
subtracted 3 from each score so that subjects’ responses now ranged from -2 to +2 for 
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each item. Items 4 through 7 were reverse-scored items, so we multiplied subjects’ 
responses for these items with -1. Finally, we took the arithmetic mean of the eight items 
to come up with a singular AOT Scale score for each subject. The subjects’ AOT scale 
scores ranged from -0.625 to 1.5 in Pilot Study 1A (MP1A = 0.609), and from -0.5 to 1.5 in 
Pilot Study 1B (MP1B = 0.542). We hypothesized that if someone scores high on the AOT 
scale, they should have better calibration. A Pearson’s product-moment correlation test 
between AOT scale scores and calibration scores for each subject confirmed our 
hypothesis (r = -0.42, t(29) = -2.5, p = 0.02 in Pilot Study 1A; r = -0.33, t(40) = -2.2, p = 
0.03 in Pilot Study 1B). 
We also thought that people who score high on the AOT scale would also be more 
accurate. We used Brier scores to assess the accuracy of the subjects.  To test the 
correlation between actively open-minded thinking and accuracy, we ran a Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation between AOT-Beliefs and average Brier scores for each 
subject. We did not find any support for our hypothesis (r = 0.03, t(29) = 0.19, p = 0.85 in 
Pilot Study 1A; r = 0.08, t(40) = 0.50, p = 0.62 in Pilot Study 1B). 
Next we calculated a new measure by looking at the reasons subjects listed for 
each question, which we call AOT-Reasons. According to this measure, subjects gained 1 
point for giving a reason that is for an option other than their preferred option or a reason 
that is against their preferred option. They did not get any points for giving a reason that 
supports their preferred option. We expected this measure to be positively correlated with 
AOT-Beliefs. A Pearson’s product moment correlation showed a negative correlation 
between these two measures (r = -0.44, t(29) = -2.64, p = 0.01, two-tailed, in Pilot Study 
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1A; r = -0.25, t(40) = -1.64, p = 0.11, two-tailed, in Pilot Study 1B). These unexpected 
results might be due to the fact that subjects were not able to write many reasons for 
questions since they found them to be difficult.
Discussion
 In these two studies we looked at individual differences in actively open-minded 
thinking as well as what kinds of questions might be suitable for studies to test the 
validity of a new actively open-minded measure based on subjects’ reasoning. Because 
we did not require subjects to list more than one reason, many subjects did not list more 
than one reason per question. Additionally, the majority of the reasons listed by subjects 
were those which explained why their preferred option was the correct answer. This made 
it difficult for us to assess individual differences in actively open-minded thinking by 
either the attitudinal or the behavioral measures. We did not observe any correlations 
between these two measures, and correlational tests run between these measures and 
accuracy scores did not yield any meaningful results either.  
The task difficulty probably exacerbated subjects’ poor performance in this study. 
Because we told our subjects not to look up information on the Web, even if our subjects 
were able to utilize actively open-minding thinking principles, they had to rely on their 
own knowledge base, which most of the time was lacking for the questions they had to 
answer. In Pilot Study 1A, for only 2 questions out of 25 they had to answer, the average 
percentage of giving a correct answer was above 75%; and only for 10 questions at least 
half of the subjects were able to answer the questions correctly, and similarly, in Pilot 
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Study 1B, for only 2 questions out of 20 they had to answer, the average percentage of 
giving a correct answer was above 75%; and only for 12 questions at least half of the 
subjects were able to answer the questions correctly (see Appendix B-2 for the percentage 
of correct answers for each question). Therefore, we decided to repeat these studies with 
some modifications and changes to the questions.
Pilot Study 2 
 The main purpose of this study was to systematically choose questions to be used 
in Studies 2 and 3. 
Method 
 Subjects. Eighty-eight subjects participated in the study. The subjects’ age ranged 
from 22 to 78 (Median = 49.5); 73.8% were female. The make-up of the subjects in this 
study were the same as those in previous studies. Subjects were paid $6 for their 
participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects was notified by email when 
the study was ready, and the study was removed when there were about 85 subjects, and 
thus aiming for 90.  
 Questions. There were 114 questions with three answer options A, B, and C. In 
20 of the questions, subjects were asked to pick the most populous city. A second set of 
20 questions asked subjects to pick the most populous country, while a third set of 20 
questions asked them to pick the most populous U.S. state. A fourth set of 20 questions 
asked subjects to pick the highest ranking university. For the university ranking 
questions, the 2014 Academic Ranking of the World Universities was used. This ranking 
is also know as Shanghai Ranking, and is published by Shanghai Ranking Consultancy. A 
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fifth set of 20 questions asked subjects to pick the movie that had the most recent release 
date. The last 14 questions were items chosen from a list of new CRT questionnaire, 
which consisted of logic and arithmetic questions (Baron et al., 2015). A full list of 
questions and answers can be found in Appendix B-2. 
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-2). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args3.html.  
 Each subject answered 60 random questions picked out of 114 questions in 
randomized order (see Appendix B-2 for a list of all questions used in this study). On 
each page the subjects saw one question with three answer options A, B, and C. They 
were first asked to pick their preferred answer, and then were asked to state the 
probability that each answer could be correct. The subjects were given choices for 
probabilities, and were instructed to choose the one that was closest to what they thought. 
The options for probability judgments were 0, 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 90, 95, 99, 
and 100 (in percent).  
Results 
To pick the questions to be used in later studies, we ran a biserial correlation 
between the variable Correct (where 1 = subject answered the question correctly, 0 = 
subject answered the question incorrectly)  and the subject means of variable Correct to 
assess discrimination and fitted a Rasch model on Correct to assess difficulty of the panel 
of questions. Appendix B-2 shows the discrimination and difficulty coefficients for each 
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chosen question. We tried to pick questions that were on the more difficult side of the 
difficulty scale as well as those that had better discrimination.
Pilot Study 3 
 The main purpose of this study was to test the possibility of using numerical 
estimation questions in Studies 3 and 5. 
Method 
 Subjects. Ninety-eight subjects participated in the study. The subjects’ age ranged 
from 19 to 78 (Median = 50.5); 72.4% were female. The make-up of the subjects in this 
study were the same as those in previous studies. Subjects were paid $4 for their 
participation (through PayPal). A panel of about 200 subjects was notified by email when 
the study was ready, and the study was removed when we had about 100 subjects. 
 Questions. There were 40 questions that asked for numerical answers. A full list 
of questions can be found in Appendix B-2. The questions were made up based on the 
data available on government websites, national newspapers, and research centers. 
 Procedure. Subjects did the task on their own computers over the Internet. They 
first read the instructions regarding the task (see Appendix C-2). The instructions and the 
full study can be found on http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/bg/args/args6.html.  
 Each subjects answered 40 questions in randomized order. Subjects saw one 
question on each page (e.g., “What percentage of U.S.citizens do not have health 
insurance?”) and were asked to submit a point estimate. After entering their best estimate 
they were told to give two more numbers, a lower number, below their best judgments, 
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and an upper number above it. They were also instructed to choose these two numbers so 
that there would be a 90% chance that the right answer is in the interval between them. 
After entering a lower and upper number, they were reminded that the two numbers they 
put in meant that they thought there was a 90% chance that the right answer was between 
their upper and lower numbers, and if they did not think this was the case, they were 
advised to adjust their numbers. After they answered all the questions, they were given an 
AOT scale (see Table 2). 
Results 
Selecting Questions for Study 3
Since subjects were asked to make point estimates and give us confidence 
intervals for their point estimates, we had to come up with a scoring rule that would 
accommodate our data. Jose and Winkler (2009) discusses a linear scoring rule for 
evaluating quantile estimates that would be preferable over the more commonly used 
scoring rules, but their scoring rule is designed as an incentive to get experts to give the 
most accurate quantile estimates. However, our aim in this study was not to incentivize 
people to give us more accurate estimates, but score subjects’ performance to pick 
questions for the next two studies. Therefore, we used a scoring rule that fit this purpose. 
The scoring rule would also need to be viable for percentage questions. Finally, we 
wanted a scoring rule that would be able to assess both under- and overconfidence 
together such that we would be able to use this scoring rule while analyzing the data from 
later studies. Therefore, we came up with a scoring rule, which we call CIscore. We next 
describe how we thought about this scoring rule and how to calculate it.
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We thought that we could compare the given alpha (0.05) with what the alpha 
would be if the true value were at one end of the confidence interval, which we will call 
the inferred alpha. In particular, we wanted to use a logistic function instead of a normal 
distribution to get the inferred alpha. The reason for using a logistic function is that this 
function is linear in log odds, and thus makes the calculations simpler.
Let us suppose that we look up alpha levels in a logistic function instead of a 
normal one,  such that x is the numerical continuum, with 0 in the middle. The 90% 
confidence interval would be between where y(x)l = 0.05 and y(x)h = 0.95. The confidence 
interval corresponding to X0, the true value or the correct answer, would be the value of y 
at x = X0. If we transform the probability scale, the vertical axis in the graph of the 
logistic function to log odds, log(y/(1-y)), we find that the new function is a linear 
function of x. Therefore, the log odds of the deviation of X0 from Xh, upper boundary of 
the confidence interval (or Xl, lower boundary of the confidence interval) is a linear 
function of the difference between X0 and Xh (or Xl). Thus, we measure accuracy of the 
interval as, 
If a subject sets their confidence intervals correctly, the mean of these differences should 
be 0.
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To pick the questions we looked at the means of CIscore for each question, and 
excluded the questions where the subjects’ CIscores seemed out of proportion. This left 
us with 25 questions to be used for Study 3 (see Appendix B).
Selecting Questions for Study 5
For selecting questions to be used in Study 5, we used absolute log error to measure the 
accuracy of subjects’ best estimates, which we call Besterror, and an alternative accuracy 
score to measure their confidence intervals, which we call Overconf. Below we describe 
the reasoning and calculation of these two accuracy scores.
As mentioned above, Besterror was the absolute log error of subject’s best 
estimate (best), which we calculated as follows: 
                                                                              , where X0 is the correct answer. 
We used a slightly different accuracy score formula for percentage questions. We 
thought that the best way to measure the accuracy of the central tendency on a percentage 
question was to use log odds, similar to the CIscore explained above. However, using log 
odds might be problematic in some cases on percentage questions. Let us consider a 
subject with 100% as best estimate for a question. If we were to calculate the log odds for 
this estimate, we would get infinity. Therefore, we introduced a small correction 
suggested by Ariely et al. (2000) and Baron et al. (2014) and used extensively in 
literature to fix this problem. Specifically we rescaled the odds ratio before taking log 
odds so that it was between 0.01 and 0.99 instead of 0 to 1.00, such that 
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This approach is advantageous because log odds considers the distance from both 
0 and 1.00, so it does not necessitate an arbitrary decision about which end of the scale to 
use. Additionally, this approach gives full weight to errors near the ends of the scale.
Our new accuracy score, Overconf, which used subjects’ confidence interval 
judgments, looked at how serious subjects’ errors would be given where their best 
estimate and the boundaries of their confidence interval judgments fell. Let us consider 
the case where the true value is higher than subject’s best estimate. Next, consider where 
the upper confidence interval bound (Xh) falls. If the subject’s best estimate is below the 
true value, then the error is not very serious. If it is just above the best estimate, then that 
is a very serious error. We can, then, compute the ratio (X0-Xh)/(X0-best), and raise this 
ratio to 0 if it is less than 0 so that we eliminate the cases in which the true value is within 
the confidence interval. Then, we can do the analogous calculation for when the true 
value is less than subject’s best estimate, (Xl-X0)/(best-X0). This way all the scores are 
between 0 and 1. The idea with this score is that AOT should reduce overconfidence, and 
not necessarily affect underconfidence, so Overconf does not assess underconfidence. 
However, one can develop an alternative measure of underconfidence along the same 
lines very easily. 
To pick the questions for Study 5, we first looked at the Cronbach’s alpha values 
of Overconf and Besterror to see if there were any items that were reverse-correlated. 
This resulted in the exclusion of six items. Next, we looked at the means of item means 
of Overconf and Besterror, and picked questions that had the lowest means in both 
scoring methods. This left us with 20 questions. Finally, we modified the wording of 
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some of these questions to make them clearer (see Appendix B-2 for a list of questions 
used in Study 5).  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APPENDIX B-1: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS USED IN REPORTED STUDIES 
Study 1A 
ANSWERS: 
1. A, 2. B, 3. B, 4. A, 5. A, 6. C, 7. C, 8. C, 9. B, 10. A, 11. C, 12. A, 13. B, 14. C, 15. A, 
16. B, 17. A, 18. C, 19. B, 20. A 
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CITY QUESTIONS: Which is largest?
1 A. Chicago, IL B. Washington, D. C. C. Seattle, WA
2 A. Philadelphia, PA B. Boston, MA C. Baltimore, MD
3 A. Phoenix, AZ B. Atlanta, GA C. Louisville, KY
4 A. San Francisco, CA B. Dallas, TX C. Portland, OR
5 A. Baltimore, MD B. Columbus, OH C. Las Vegas, NV
6 A. Las Vegas, NV B. Milwaukee, WI C. St. Louis, MO
7 A. Indianapolis, IN B. Cincinnati, OH C. Tampa, FL
8 A. Nashville, TN B. Orlando, FL C. Milwaukee, WI
9 A. Austin, TX B. Dallas, TX C. Atlanta, GA
10 A. San Antonio, TX B. Hartford, CT C. Austin, TX
11 A. Albany, NY B. Cincinnati, OH C. Salt Lake City, UT
12 A. Denver, CO B. Reno, NV C. Raleigh, NC
13 A. Detroit, MI B. Houston, TX C. Cleveland, OH
14 A. Minneapolis, MN B. Denver, CO C. Phoenix, AZ
15 A. Seattle, WA B. San Diego, CA C. Baltimore, MD
16 A. Pittsburgh, PA B. Portland, OR C. Sacramento, CA
17 A. Honolulu, HI B. Anchorage, AK C. Little Rock, AR
18 A. Syracuse, NY B. Tucson, AZ C. Knoxville, TN
19 A. Boston, MA B. Washington, D. C. C. Miami, FL
20 A. Philadelphia, PA B. Baltimore, MD C. Minneapolis, MN
Study 1B 
ANSWERS: 
1. C, 2. A, 3. C, 4. B, 5. B,  6. C, 7. A, 8. A, 9. B, 10. B, 11. A, 12. B, 13. B, 14. C, 15. C, 
16. B, 17. C, 18. A, 19. B, 20. C 
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CALORIE CONTENT QUESTIONS: Most calories per serving?
1 A. Bread, whole wheat or multi-grain
B. Almonds C. Sweet corn, cooked
2 A. Lentils, cooked B. Brown rice, cooked C. Spaghetti, whole-wheat, cooked
3 A. Turnip greens, boiled B. Green peas, cooked C. Artichoke, cooked
4 A. Carrot, raw B. Potato, with skin, cooked C. Bread, rye
5 A. Banana B. Oat bran muffin C. Strawberries
FIBER CONTENT QUESTIONS: Most fiber per serving?
6 A. Cheese B. Pasta C. Salad dressing
7 A. Bacon B. Beef C. Sausage, pork
8 A. Dates B. Potato salad C. Brown rice
9 A. Hard boiled eggs B. Oats C. Orange juice
10 A. Avocado B. Peanut butter C. Milk chocolate
FAT CONTENT QUESTIONS: Most fat per serving?
11 A. Egg, fried B. Cod, fried in batter C. Olives, in brine
12 A. Grilled lamb chops B. Cream cheese C. Duck roast
13 A. Pancake B. Cheesecake C. Tomato and cheese pizza
14 A. Canned salmon B. Canned tuna, in oil C. Canned sardines
15 A. Roasted and salted peanuts B. Chestnuts C. Walnuts
PROTEIN CONTENT QUESTIONS: Most protein per serving?
16 A. Lean ground beef B. Chicken breast C. Ground turkey
17 A. Lamb B. Steak, lean cut C. Tofu
18 A. Greek yoghurt B. Cottage cheese C. Swiss cheese
19 A. Hummus B. Black beans C. Edamame beans
20 A. Shrimp B. Tuna C. Cod
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QUESTION ANSWER
1 What percentage of American employees can receive paid sick leave?
61
2 What is the average annual household income of Broadway 
theatergoers? (in U.S. dollars)
201500
3 How many construction workers in India are women? (in millions)
8
4 How many tanning salons are there in the U.S.? 14000
5 How many automobiles were sold in the U.S. in 2014? (in millions)
16.5
6 How many inches of snow did Boston, MA, get this past winter 
season (2014-2015)?
108.6
7 What percentage of U.S. adults are vegetarians? 5
8 What's the average cost for a middle-income family to raise a 
child born in 2013 until age 18? (in U.S. dollars)
245340
9 How much money did the movies released in 2014 make? (in billion U.S. dollars)
9.69
10 What percentage of U.S.citizens do not have health insurance? 12.9
11 How many original TV shows aired in the U.S. in 2014? 328
12
How many pounds of Haas avocados (the avocados one 
normally purchases at the U.S. grocery stores) were sold in the 
U.S. in 2014? (in billions)
1.9
13
According to the 2013 American community Survey, how many 
U.S. residents speak a language other than English at home? (in 
millions)
61.8
14 How much does college education cost per year on average in all 
institutions in the U.S.? (in U.S. dollars)
33047
15 What is the average math SAT score in the U.S., out of 800? 513
!132
QUESTION ANSWER
16 What is the average one-way commute time in the U.S. in 
minutes?
25.4
17 In what percentage of U.S. households does someone play video games?
67
18 What's the average age of someone who plays video games with 
some regularity?
30
19 What percentage of women in the U.S. play video games? 47
20 What was the median gross rent between 2009-2013 in New 
York City, NY? (in U.S.  dollars)
1200
21 What's the U.S. per capita red meat consumption for 2014 in pounds?
101.4
22 What's the average age of a white female Broadway theatergoer? 44
23 What's the average human life expectancy (in years) at birth in the world according to 2010 data?
67.2
24 How many books do American adults (ages 18+) on average 
read per year?
12
25 What is the direct distance between San Francisco and Tokyo, in miles?
5140
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QUESTION ANSWER
1 What percentage of American employees can receive paid sick leave? 61
2 What is the average annual household income of Broadway theatergoers? (in U.S. dollars)
201500
3 How many tanning salons are there in the U.S.? 14000
4 How many inches of snow did Boston, MA, get this past winter season (2014-2015)?
108.6
5 What percentage of U.S. adults are vegetarians (someone who does not eat meat or seefood)?
5
6 What's the average cost for a middle-income family to raise a child born in 2013 until age 18? (in U.S. dollars)
245340
7 What percentage of U.S.citizens do not have health insurance? 12.9
8 According to the 2013 American community Survey, how many U.S. residents speak a language other than English at home? (in millions)
61.8
9 How much does college education cost per year on average in all institutions in the U.S.? (in U.S. dollars)
33047
10 What is the average math SAT score in the U.S., out of 800? 513
11 What is the average one-way commute time in the U.S. in minutes? 25.4
12 In what percentage of U.S. households does someone play video games? 67
13 What's the average age of someone who plays video games with some regularity?
30
14 What was the median gross rent between 2009-2013 in New York City, NY? (in U.S.  dollars)
1200
15 What's the average age of a white female Broadway theatergoer? 44
16 How many people in the U.S. died in motor vehicle crashes in 2013? 32719
17 What's the average human life expectancy (in years) at birth in the world according to 2010 data?
67.2
18 How many business bachelor’s degrees were granted in the U.S. in 2011-2012?
366800
19 How many education bachelor’s degrees were granted in the U.S. in 2011-2012?
106800
20 What is the direct distance between San Francisco and Tokyo, in miles? 5140
APPENDIX B-2: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS USED IN PILOT STUDIES 
Pilot Study 1A 
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CITY QUESTIONS: Which is largest?
1 A. Chicago, IL B. Washington, D. C. C. Seattle, WA
2 A. Philadelphia, PA B. Boston, MA C. Baltimore, MD
3 A. Phoenix, AZ B. Atlanta, GA C. Louisville, KY
4 A. San Francisco, CA B. Dallas, TX C. Portland, OR
5 A. Baltimore, MD B. Columbus, OH C. Las Vegas, NV
6 A. Las Vegas, NV B. Milwaukee, WI C. St. Louis, MO
7 A. Indianapolis, IN B. Cincinnati, OH C. Tampa, FL
8 A. Nashville, TN B. Orlando, FL C. Milwaukee, WI
9 A. Austin, TX B. Dallas, TX C. Atlanta, GA
10 A. San Antonio, TX B. Hartford, CT C. Austin, TX
LOGIC QUESTIONS: 
11 All flowers have petals.                         Roses have petals.
A. Roses are flowers.                                                                    
B. Some roses are flowers.                                                            
C. We cannot conclude anything about roses and flowers.
12 All mammals walk.                              Whales are mammals.
A. Whales walk.                                                                                  
B. Whales do not walk.                                                                     
C. We cannot conclude whether whales walk.
13 All things that have a motor need oil. Automobiles need oil.
A. Some things with motors are automobiles.                                
B. Automobiles have a motor.                                                         
C. We cannot conclude anything about automobiles and motors.
14 All living things need water.                   Roses need water.
A. Roses are living things.                                                                  
B. Some living things are roses.                                                         
C. We cannot conclude anything about roses and living things.
15 All vehicles have wheels.                       Boats are vehicles.
A. Boats do not have wheels.                                                              
B. Boats have wheels.                                                                        
C. We cannot conclude anything about boats and wheels.
16. 
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MATRIX QUESTIONS: Which fits best? (The images are listed at the end of this table.)
16 A. 1 B. 2 C. 6
17 A. 6 B. 7 C. 8
18 A. 3 B. 7 C. 8
19 A. 1 B. 2 C. 8
20 A. 1 B. 5 C. 8
21 A. 2 B. 4 C. 8
22 A. 2 B. 3 C.6
23 A. 4 B. 5 C. 6
24 A. 2 B. 3 C. 5
25 A. 4 B. 5 C. 6
17. 
18. 
!138
19.  
20. 
!139
21.  
22. 
!140
23.  
24.  
!141
25.  
!142
Pilot Study 1B 
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CITY QUESTIONS: Which is largest? % CORRECT
26 A. Albany, NY B. Cincinnati, OH C. Salt Lake City, UT 45
27 A. Denver, CO B. Reno, NV C. Raleigh, NC 62
28 A. Detroit, MI B. Houston, TX C. Cleveland, OH 55
29 A. Minneapolis, MN
B. Denver, CO C. Phoenix, AZ 36
30 A. Seattle, WA B. San Diego, CA C. Baltimore, MD 31
31 A. Pittsburgh, PA B. Portland, OR C. Sacramento, CA 21
32 A. Honolulu, HI B. Anchorage, AK C. Little Rock, AR 50
33 A. Syracuse, NY B. Tucson, AZ C. Knoxville, TN 29
34 A. Boston, MA B. Washington, D. C. C. Miami, FL 19
35 A. Philadelphia, PA B. Baltimore, MD C. Minneapolis, MN 57
LOGIC QUESTIONS: 
36 In a box, some red things are square, and some square things are large.
A. Some red things are large.                                                       
B. All red things are large.                                                                 
C. We can’t conclude anything 
about red things and large things. 
62
37 In a box, no green things are round, and all round things are large.
A. No green things are large.                                                                     
B. Some green things are not 
large.                                                      
C. We can’t conclude anything 
about green things and large 
things.
60
38 In a box, no blue things are triangular, and no triangular things are large.
A. No blue things are large.                                                                
B. Some blue things are not large.                                                      
C. We can’t conclude anything 
about blue things and large things. 
57
39
Jack is looking at Anne but Anne is looking 
at George. Jack is married but George is not. 
Is a married person looking at an unmarried 
person?
A. Yes                                                       
B. No                                                              
C. Cannot be determined
12
ANSWERS:  
1. A, 2. B, 3. B, 4. A, 5. A, 6. C, 7. C, 8. C, 9. B, 10. A, 11. C, 12. A, 13. C, 14. C, 15. B, 
16. C, 17. A, 18. B, 19. B, 20. A, 21. B, 22. A, 23. A, 24. A, 25. B, 26. C, 27. A, 28. B, 29. 
C, 30. A, 31. C, 32. A, 33. C, 34. B, 35. A, 36. C, 37. C, 38. C, 39. A, 40. B, 41. C, 42. B, 
43. C, 44. B, 45. NA , 46. B, 47. C 35
 This question did not have one correct answer and was excluded from data analyses.35
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COGNITIVE REFLECTION TASK (CRT) QUESTIONS:
40
If it takes 2 nurses 2 minutes to measure the 
blood pressure of 2 patients, how long would 
it take 200 nurses to measure the blood 
pressure of 200 patients?
A. 200          B. 2              C. Other 57
41
Soup and salad cost $5.50 in total. The soup 
costs a dollar more than the salad. How 
much does the salad cost?
A. $4.50       B. $3.50       C. Other 86
42
Sally is making sun tea. Every hour, the 
concentration of the tea doubles. If it takes 6 
hours for the tea to be ready, how long 
would it take for the tea to reach half of the 
final concentration?
A. 3 hours     B. 5 hours   C. Other 48
WORD ANALOGY QUESTIONS
43 to : too :: loot: _____ A. steal      B. toot        C. lute 57
44 haste : waste :: _____ : crowd A. fast       B. three      C. group 57
45 _____ : rainfall :: condensation : humidity A. ground  B. cloud     C. forecast NA
46 no : know :: steal : _____ A. rob        B. steel       C. don’t 88
47 essay : thesis :: article : ______ A. book     B. fiction    C. topic 52
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QUESTION ANSWER
1 How many business bachelor's degrees were granted in the U.S. 
2011-2012?
109000
2 How many psychology bachelor's degrees were granted in the 
U.S. in 2011-2012?
366800
3 How many health professions and related programs bachelor's 
degrees were granted in the U.S. in 2011-2012?
163400
4 How many education bachelor's degrees were granted in the U.S. in 2011-2012?
106800
5 What percentage of American employees can receive paid sick 
leave?
61
6 How many employees of Aetna, a health insurance company, have taken the company's free yoga classes so far?
13000
7 What is the average annual household income of Broadway 
theatergoers? (in U.S. dollars)
201500
8 How many construction workers in India are women? (in millions)
8
9 How many tanning salons are there in the U.S.? 14000
10 How many automobiles were sold in the U.S. in 2014? (in millions)
16.5
11 How many inches of snow did Boston, MA, get this past winter 
season (2014-2015)?
108.6
12 What percentage of U.S. adults are vegetarians? 5
13 How much profit did the American insurance industry make in 
2014? (in billion U.S. dollars)
338
14 What's the average cost for a middle-income family to raise a child born in 2013 until age 18? (in U.S. dollars)
245340
15 How much money did the movies released in 2014 make? (in 
billion U.S. dollars)
9.69
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QUESTION ANSWER
16 What percentage of U.S.citizens do not have health insurance? 12.9
17 How many original TV shows aired in the U.S. in 2014? 328
18
How many pounds of Haas avocados (the avocados one normally 
purchases at the U.S. grocery stores) were sold in the U.S. in 
2014? (in billions)
1.9
19 How many U.S. households own dogs? 43346000
20 How many U.S. households own cats? 36117000
21 How many U.S. households own horses? 1780000
22
According to the 2013 American community Survey, how many 
U.S. residents speak a language other than English at home? (in 
millions)
61.8
23 How much does college education cost per year on average in all 
institutions in the U.S.? (in U.S. dollars)
33047
24 What is the average math SAT score in the U.S., out of 800? 513
25 What is the average one-way commute time in the U.S. in 
minutes?
25.4
26 In what percentage of U.S. households does someone play video games?
67
27 What's the average age of someone who plays video games with 
some regularity?
30
28 What percentage of women in the U.S. play video games? 47
29 What was the median gross rent between 2009-2013 in New York 
City, NY? (in U.S.  dollars)
1200
30 In 2013 for how many people in the U.S. influenza was the cause of death?
3697
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QUESTION ANSWER
31 In 2013 for how many people in the U.S. Alzheimer's Disease was 
the cause of death?
84767
32 How many marriages were there in the U.S. in 2012? 2131000
33 How many divorces and annulments were there in the U.S. in 
2012?
851000
34 In 2013 how many unmarried women gave birth? 1595873
35 What's the U.S. per capita red meat consumption for 2014 in 
pounds?
101.4
36 What's the average age of a white female Broadway theatergoer? 44
37 How many people in the U.S. died in motor vehicle crashes in 
2013?
32719
38 What's the average human life expectancy (in years) at birth in the world according to 2010 data?
67.2
39 How many books do American adults (ages 18+) on average read 
per year?
12
40 What is the direct distance between San Francisco and Tokyo, in miles?
5140
APPENDIX C-1: STUDY INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECTS 
STUDY 1A 
This study contains 20 questions, each with three possible answers, A, B, and C. We are 
interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask you to make 
notes about your thoughts. Each note should give one, and only one, reason for or against 
one of the three possible answers. You have space for 6 notes, which should be plenty; 
you don't have to use all 6, but you must give at least two reasons. Please refrain from 
writing non-English phrases or putting in statements such as "I don't know" or "I'm not 
sure" that are not actually reasons. We would like you to say briefly why you think an 
answer might be correct or wrong. 
Then we ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the 
correct choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are 
completely certain that an answer is correct. But if you just guess, you have about a 33% 
chance of being correct. We give you choices for the probability; choose the one that is 
closest to what you think. Your probability estimates for the three answers should add up 
to about 100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
On the next page, after the reasons, we ask you to classify each of your reasons, telling us 
whether it is for, or against, Answer A, Answer B, or Answer C. 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
On Each Question Page: 
In this study, you are given three city names, and are asked to determine which of the 
three cities is located in the most populous metropolitan areas of the United States. 
According to Wikipedia, a metropolitan area is "a region consisting of a densely 
populated urban area and its less-populated surrounding territories, sharing industry, 
infrastructure, and housing". Your task is to select the city that is in the most populated 
urban area. 
Examples of reasons: 'It looks bigger on a map'; 'It is a national capital'; 'It has two 
airports'; 'I have heard more about it'; 'It has more sports teams'. Any one of these can be 
made negative, for example, 'It looks small on a map'. 
STUDY 1B  
This study contains 20 questions, each with three possible answers, A, B, and C. We are 
interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask you to make 
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notes about your thoughts. Each note should give one, and only one, reason for or against 
one of the three possible answers. You have space for 6 notes; you don't have to use all 6, 
but you must give at least two reasons. Please refrain from putting in statements such as 
"I don't know" or "I'm not sure" that are not actually reasons. We would like you to say 
briefly why you think an answer might be correct or incorrect. 
Then we ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the 
correct choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are 
completely certain that an answer is correct. But if you just guess, you have about a 33% 
chance of being correct. We give you choices for the probability; choose the one that is 
closest to what you think. Your probabilities for the three answers should add up to about 
100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
In this study, you are given three food names or descriptions, and you are asked to 
determine which of the three foods listed have the highest calorie content, fiber content, 
fat content, or protein content. Please pay attention to what the question is specifically 
asking for. 
Examples of reasons are: 'tastes sweet'; 'vegetables are usually high fiber'; 'meat usually 
has fat'; 'servings are small’. 
On the next page, after the reasons, we ask you to classify each of your reasons, telling us 
whether it is for, or against, Answer A, Answer B, or Answer C. 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
For Calorie Content Items: 
For the following questions, please pick the food with the highest CALORIE content per 
serving. 
For Fiber Content Items: 
For the following questions below, please pick the food that has the most amount of 
FIBER per 100 grams (~ 3.53 ounces). 
For Fat Content Items: 
For the following questions, please pick the food with the highest FAT content per 100 
grams (~ 3.53 ounces). 
For Protein Content Items: 
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For the following questions, please pick the food with the highest PROTEIN content per 
serving. 
STUDY 2  
This study contains 20 questions, each with three possible answers, A, B, and C. Please 
pay attention to what each question is asking before you answer. 
We are interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask you to 
make notes about your thoughts. Each note should give one, and only one, reason for or 
against one of the three possible answers. You have space for 6 notes; you don't have to 
use all 6, but you must give at least two reasons. Please refrain from putting in statements 
such as "I don't know" or "I'm not sure" that are not actually reasons. We would like you 
to say briefly why you think an answer might be correct or incorrect. 
Here is an example question: 
Please pick the most populous country below. 
1. Norway 
2. Denmark 
3. Germany 
Example Reasons: 
Germany has a lot of cities. 
Denmark has Greenland, which is very big. 
Greenland is not really populated. 
Then we ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the 
correct choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are 
completely certain that an answer is correct. But if you just guess, you have about a 33% 
chance of being correct. We give you choices for the probability; choose the one that is 
closest to what you think. Your probabilities for the three answers should add up to about 
100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
On the next page, after the reasons, we ask you to classify each of your reasons, telling us 
whether it is for, or against, Answer A, Answer B, or Answer C. 
Example Reason Classification: 
Germany has a lot of cities (For C) 
Denmark has Greenland, which is very big. (For B) 
Greenland is not really populated. (Against B) 
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The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
STUDY 3 
This study contains 20 questions about numbers. Try to answer the questions as 
accurately as you can without getting any outside or online help. 
We are also interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask 
you to make notes about your reasons. Each note should give one, and only one, reason. 
You have space for 5 notes. You don't have to use all 5, but you must give at least two 
reasons. 
Below is an example question with possible answers and reasons to help you get a better 
idea about what this study will be like. 
Question: How many cups of coffee on average are consumed by Americans consume 
every day? 
Let's assume that you gave the following answer. 
Best estimate: 300,000,000 
Lower number: 250,000,000 
Higher number: 400,000,000 
Next, you list some reasons/factors that affect your answers. Then you classify each 
reason as to its relation to your answer. For example: 
Reasons: 
The U.S. population is around 300 million. (classification: why my answer makes sense) 
People work long hours in this country. (why my answer makes sense) 
Not everyone drinks/likes coffee. (why my answer might be too high) 
Each coffee drinker is likely to drink several cups. (why it might be too low) 
Maybe my figure about the population is way off. (why it might be too high or too low) 
(The correct number is 400 million cups a day.) 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
STUDY 4 
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This study contains 20 questions, each with three possible answers, A, B, and C. Please 
pay attention to what each question is asking before you answer. Try to answer the 
questions as accurately as you can without getting any outside or online help. 
We are also interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask 
you to make notes about your thoughts. Each note should give one, and only one, reason 
for or against one of the three possible answers. You have space for 5 notes; you don't 
have to use all 5, but you must give at least two reasons.On some pages, you will also be 
asked to put in different kinds of reasons, so please pay attention to the instructions that 
appear in blue. 
Here is an example question: 
Please pick the most populous country below. 
1. Norway 
2. Denmark 
3. Germany 
Example Reasons: 
Germany has a lot of cities. 
Denmark has Greenland, which is very big. 
Greenland is not really populated. 
Then we ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the 
correct choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are 
completely certain that an answer is correct. But if you just guess, you have about a 33% 
chance of being correct. We give you choices for the probability; choose the one that is 
closest to what you think. Your probabilities for the three answers should add up to about 
100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
After you put in your probability judgments, we ask you to classify each of your reasons, 
telling us whether it is for, or against, Answer A, Answer B, or Answer C, or none in 
particular. 
Example Reason Classification: 
Germany has a lot of cities (For C) 
Denmark has Greenland, which is very big. (For B) 
Greenland is not really populated. (Against B) 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
STUDY 5  
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This study contains 20 questions about numbers. Try to answer the questions as 
accurately as you can without getting any outside or online help. 
We are also interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask 
you to make notes about your reasons. Each note should give one, and only one, reason. 
You have space for 5 notes. You don't have to use all 5, but you must give at least two 
reasons. 
Below is an example question with possible answers and reasons to help you get a better 
idea about what this study will be like. 
Question: How many cups of coffee on average are consumed by Americans consume 
every day? 
Let's assume that you gave the following answer. 
Best estimate: 300,000,000 
Lower number: 250,000,000 
Higher number: 400,000,000 
Next, you list some reasons/factors that affect your answers. Then you classify each 
reason as to its relation to your answer. For example: 
Reasons: 
The U.S. population is around 300 million. (classification: why my answer makes sense) 
People work long hours in this country. (why my answer makes sense) 
Not everyone drinks/likes coffee. (why my answer might be too high) 
Each coffee drinker is likely to drink several cups. (why it might be too low) 
Maybe my figure about the population is way off. (why it might be too high or too low) 
(The correct number is 400 million cups a day.) 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
STUDY 6  
This study contains 20 questions about numbers. Try to answer the questions as 
accurately as you can without getting any outside or online help. You will be asked to 
submit your best estimate, a lower bound that is lower than your best estimate, and a 
higher bound, that is higher than your best estimate. Some questions tell you in which 
unit your answer should be, so please pay attention to these. 
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We are also interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask 
you to make notes about your reasons. Each note should give one, and only one, reason. 
You have space for 5 notes. You don't have to use all 5, but you must give at least two 
reasons. 
Below is an example question with possible answers and reasons to help you get a better 
idea about what this study will be like. 
Question: How many cups of coffee on average are consumed by Americans every day? 
Let's assume that you gave the following answers. 
Best estimate: 300,000,000 
Lower number: 250,000,000 
Higher number: 400,000,000 
Next, you list some reasons/factors that affect your answers. Then you classify each 
reason as to its relation to your answer. For example: 
Reasons: 
The U.S. population is around 300 million. (classification: why my answer makes sense) 
People work long hours in this country. (why my answer makes sense) 
Not everyone drinks/likes coffee. (why my answer might be too high) 
Each coffee drinker is likely to drink several cups. (why it might be too low) 
Maybe my figure about the population is way off. (why it might be too high or too low) 
(The correct number is 400 million cups a day.) 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
STUDY 7  
First Part Instructions: 
This study contains 20 questions, each with three possible answers, A, B, and C. Please 
pay attention to what each question is asking before you answer. Try to answer the 
questions as accurately as you can without getting any outside or online help. 
We are interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we ask you to 
make notes about your thoughts. Each note should give one, and only one, reason for or 
against one of the three possible answers. You have space for 5 notes; you don't have to 
use all 5, but you must give at least two reasons. 
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Here is an example question:  
Please pick the most populous country below. 
1. Norway 
2. Denmark 
3. Germany 
Example Reasons: 
Germany has a lot of cities. 
Denmark has Greenland, which is very big. 
Greenland is not really populated. 
We ask you to classify each of your reasons, telling us whether it is for, or against, 
Answer A, Answer B, or Answer C, or 'other'. Notice that if an answer is 'for B or C' then 
you can classify it as 'against A', because these are the only three options. If a reason does 
not help in distinguishing one option from another, use the 'other' response. 
Example Reason Classification: 
Germany has a lot of cities (For C) 
Denmark has Greenland, which is very big. (For B) 
Greenland is not really populated. (Against B) 
Finally we ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the 
correct choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are 
completely certain that an answer is correct. But if you just guess, you have about a 33% 
chance of being correct. We give you choices for the probability; choose the one that is 
closest to what you think. Your probabilities for the three answers should add up to about 
100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
Second Part Instructions: 
This is the same study as you did before. We think you may do better when you do it a 
second time. 
Again, we ask you to classify your answers as being for A, B, C or against one of these, 
or 'other'. A reason that is 'against A' is the same as one that is 'for B or C'. If a reason 
does not help in distinguishing one option from another, use the 'Other' response. 
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Again we ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the 
correct choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are 
completely certain that an answer is correct. But if you just guess, you have about a 33% 
chance of being correct. We give you choices for the probability; choose the one that is 
closest to what you think. Your probabilities for the three answers should add up to about 
100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking.  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APPENDIX C-2: PILOT STUDY INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECTS 
PILOT STUDY 1 
Introduction Page: 
This study contains a number of difficult questions, each with three possible answers, A, 
B, and C. We are interested in how you think about the answers. After each question, we 
ask you to make notes about your thoughts. Each note should give one, and only one, 
reason for or against one of the three possible answers. You have space for 10 notes, 
which should be plenty; you don't have to use all 10, but you must give at least one 
reason. 
Then we ask for your preferred answer, and the probability that you are correct. For the 
probability question, note that 100% means that you are completely certain. But if you 
just guess, you have about a 33% chance of being correct. We give you choices for the 
probability; choose the one that is closest to what you think. 
On the next page, we ask you to classify each of your reasons, telling us whether it is for, 
or against, Answer A, Answer B, or Answer C. 
The remaining parts of the study contain problems in logic, arithmetic, visual analogies 
(with patterns), and/or verbal analogies. 
For City Items: 
In the first part of the study, you are given three city names, and are asked to determine 
which of the three cities is located in the most populous metropolitan areas of the United 
States. According to Wikipedia, a metropolitan area is "a region consisting of a densely 
populated urban area and its less-populated surrounding territories, sharing industry, 
infrastructure, and housing". Your task is to select the city that is in the most populated 
urban area. 
Examples of reasons: 'It looks bigger on a map'; 'It is a national capital'; 'It has two 
airports'; 'I have heard more about it'; 'It has more sports teams'. Any one of these can be 
made negative, for example, 'It looks small on a map’. 
For Logic Items: 
This part is about logic. All questions give two statements and ask what we can conclude 
if both of these are true. 
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Examples of reasons are: “The conclusion is true”; “I know another example like this”; “I 
can think of an example like this where the conclusion is false”; “The two statements fit 
together to yield the conclusion.” 
For Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) Items: 
This part is about math problems. Examples of reasons are: 'This is X minus Y (where X 
and Y are numbers in the problem'; 'Next number in the sequence’. 
For Matrix Items: 
This part is about geometric matrices. Examples of reasons are: “This is similar to 
another figure;” “... completes a sequence”; “... fills in the a pattern”; “The shapes get 
larger as they go from left to right and from top to bottom”; “In each row, the first two 
images are parts of the last image.” 
For Word Analogy Items: 
This part is about word analogies. Examples of reasons are: “Same relation as A and B 
(the first two terms”; ‘"Similar to C”; “Same category as C”; “The words are synonyms, 
are so are A and B”; “The relation between A and B is the same as that between C and 
D.” 
PILOT STUDY 2 
This study contains 60 questions, each with three possible answers, A, B, and C. It is a 
preliminary study to test the items themselves. 
We ask for your preferred answer and the probabilities for any answer being the correct 
choice. For the probability questions, note that 100% means that you are completely 
certain that an answer is correct. If you just guess, you have about a 33% chance of being 
correct. We give you choices for the probability so that you don't have to enter the 
numbers yourself; choose the one that is closest to what you think. Your probabilities for 
the three answers should add up to about 100% (no more than 110%, no less than 90%). 
Please pay attention to what the question is specifically asking for. 
PILOT STUDY 3 
This study contains 40 questions about numbers. Try to answer the questions as 
accurately as you can without getting any outside or online help. 
The study ends with one additional page of questions about thinking. 
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APPENDIX D-1: TRAINING MODULE FOR STUDY 6 
The following pages include the training module for subjects in the experimental 
condition.
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APPENDIX D-2: TRAINING MODULE FOR STUDY 7 
The following pages include the training experimental condition subjects.
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APPENDIX E: PRE-TEST MODULE FOR STUDY 6 
The following pages include the pre-test module for control condition subjects.
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